In this article, we discuss the continued circulation and use of retracted science as a complex problem: Multiple stakeholders throughout the publishing ecosystem hold competing perceptions of this problem and its possible solutions. We describe how we used a participatory design process model to co-develop recommendations for addressing this problem with stakeholders in the Alfred P. Sloan-funded project, Reducing the Inadvertent Spread of Retracted Science (RISRS). After introducing the four core RISRS recommendations, we discuss how the issue of retraction-related stigma (...) gives rise to recommendation #4, Educate stakeholders about retraction and pre- and post-publication stewardship of the scholarly record. This recommendation is important for training publishing professionals and realizing this recommendation will require further collaborative design work across scholarly communications. We highlight ongoing stakeholder work which is now re-starting the design cycle. We conclude with a discussion of ongoing activities facilitating uptake and refinement of RISRS research and the implementation agenda. (shrink)

Background Retraction is a mechanism for alerting readers to unreliable material and other problems in the published scientific and scholarly record. Retracted publications generally remain visible and searchable, but the intention of retraction is to mark them as “removed” from the citable record of scholarship. However, in practice, some retracted articles continue to be treated by researchers and the public as valid content as they are often unaware of the retraction. Research over the past decade has identified a number of (...) factors contributing to the unintentional spread of retracted research. The goal of the Reducing the Inadvertent Spread of Retracted Science: Shaping a Research and Implementation Agenda (RISRS) project was to develop an actionable agenda for reducing the inadvertent spread of retracted science. This included identifying how retraction status could be more thoroughly disseminated, and determining what actions are feasible and relevant for particular stakeholders who play a role in the distribution of knowledge. -/- Methods These recommendations were developed as part of a year-long process that included a scoping review of empirical literature and successive rounds of stakeholder consultation, culminating in a three-part online workshop that brought together a diverse body of 65 stakeholders in October–November 2020 to engage in collaborative problem solving and dialogue. Stakeholders held roles such as publishers, editors, researchers, librarians, standards developers, funding program officers, and technologists and worked for institutions such as universities, governmental agencies, funding organizations, publishing houses, libraries, standards organizations, and technology providers. Workshop discussions were seeded by materials derived from stakeholder interviews (N = 47) and short original discussion pieces contributed by stakeholders. The online workshop resulted in a set of recommendations to address the complexities of retracted research throughout the scholarly communications ecosystem. -/- Results The RISRS recommendations are: (1) Develop a systematic cross-industry approach to ensure the public availability of consistent, standardized, interoperable, and timely information about retractions; (2) Recommend a taxonomy of retraction categories/classifications and corresponding retraction metadata that can be adopted by all stakeholders; (3) Develop best practices for coordinating the retraction process to enable timely, fair, unbiased outcomes; and (4) Educate stakeholders about pre- and post-publication stewardship, including retraction and correction of the scholarly record. -/- Conclusions Our stakeholder engagement study led to 4 recommendations to address inadvertent citation of retracted research, and formation of a working group to develop the Communication of Retractions, Removals, and Expressions of Concern (CORREC) Recommended Practice. Further work will be needed to determine how well retractions are currently documented, how retraction of code and datasets impacts related publications, and to identify if retraction metadata (fails to) propagate. Outcomes of all this work should lead to ensuring retracted papers are never cited without awareness of the retraction, and that, in public fora outside of science, retracted papers are not treated as valid scientific outputs. (shrink)

Warfare is becoming increasingly automated, from automatic missile defense systems to micro-UAVs (WASPs) that can maneuver through urban environments with ease, and each advance brings with it ethical questions in need of resolving. Proponents of lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) provide varied arguments in their favor; robots are capable of better identifying combatants and civilians, thus reducing "collateral damage"; robots need not protect themselves and so can incur more risks to protect innocents or gather more information before using deadly force; (...) robots can assess situations more quickly and do so without emotion, reducing the likelihood of fatal mistakes due to human error; and sending robots to war protects our own soldiers from harm. However, these arguments only point in favor of autonomous weapons systems, failing to demonstrate why such systems need be made *lethal*. In this paper I argue that if one grants all of the proponents' points in favor of LAWS, then, contrary to what might be expected, this leads to the conclusion that it would be both immoral and illegal to deploy *lethal* autonomous weapons, because the many features that speak in favor of them also undermine the need for them to be programmed to take lives. In particular, I argue that such systems, if lethal, would violate the moral and legal principle of necessity, which forbids the use of weapons that impose superfluous injury or unnecessary harm. I conclude by highlighting that the argument is not against autonomous weapons per se, but only against *lethal* autonomous weapons. (shrink)

This book is a methodological guide for the emerging, interdisciplinary science of virtue traits and their value. The authors situate this emerging empirical field in the history of psychology, critically survey existing work, defend the scientific validity of virtue science, and develop a general model that can guide, unify, and catalyze future research. In addition, chapters discuss how philosophy and philosophers can contribute to empirical inquiry and how a mature science of virtue could inform moral philosophy. The book is co-authored (...) by two psychologists and a philosopher who pursued joint empirical work on fairness and then began to discuss larger methodological issues raised by that collaboration. -/- o Expected publication date: January 31, 2024 o Paperback ISBN: 1108747981. (shrink)

Autonomous weapons systems (AWS), sometimes referred to as “killer robots”, are receiving evermore attention, both in public discourse as well as by scholars and policymakers. Much of this interest is connected with emerging ethical and legal problems linked to increasing autonomy in weapons systems, but there is a general underappreciation for the ways in which existing law might impact on these new technologies. In this paper, we argue that as AWS become more sophisticated and increasingly more capable than flesh-and-blood soldiers, (...) it will increasingly be the case that such soldiers are “in the power” of those AWS which fight against them. This implies that such soldiers ought to be considered hors de combat, and not targeted. In arguing for this point, we draw out a broader conclusion regarding hors de combat status, namely that it must be viewed contextually, with close reference to the capabilities of combatants on both sides of any discreet engagement. Given this point, and the fact that AWS may come in many shapes and sizes, and can be made for many different missions, we argue that each particular AWS will likely need its own standard for when enemy soldiers are deemed hors de combat. We conclude by examining how these nuanced views of hors de combat status might impact on meaningful human control of AWS. (shrink)

Contemporary proponents of republican political theory often focus on the concept of freedom as non-domination, and how best to promote it within a state. However, there is little attention paid to what the republican conception of freedom demands in the international realm. In this essay I examine what is required for an agent to enjoy freedom as non-domination, and argue that this might only be achieved for individuals if one of two possibilities is pursued internationally: either (1) all nations are (...) made equally powerful, such that none may arbitrarily impose its will on another without penalty, or (2) all nations are joined under a global sovereign which guarantees that the weaker states are not subject to the whims of the stronger. I further argue that the first condition cannot suffice for achieving true non-domination, and as a result, republicanism must prescribe working toward the establishment of a global state. This paper provides an important contribution to the literature by addressing the international implications of the republican conception of freedom. (shrink)

In international law and the ethics of war, there are a variety of actions which are seen as particularly problematic and presumed to be always or inherently wrong, or in need of some overwhelmingly strong justification to override the presumption against them. One of these actions is assassination, in particular, assassination of heads of state. In this essay I argue that the presumption against assassination is incorrect. In particular, I argue that if in a given scenario war is justified, then (...) assassination of the enemy state's leader is also justified, and in fact ought to be pursued as a means short of war. I defend this position on both consequential and deontic grounds, arguing that assassination is both more discriminate than war and serves to harm only those most responsible for the situation which justifies war in the first place. I conclude by arguing that a norm of assassination, far from being a destabilizing force, as some have argued, would in fact serve to reinforce international norms of rights and respect for persons by making clear that tyrants and would-be oppressors cannot hide behind military forces or notions of sovereignty to protect themselves from judgment and retribution. (shrink)

In a recent article Duncan Purves, Ryan Jenkins, and B. J. Strawser argue that in order for a decision in war to be just, or indeed the decision to resort to war to be just, it must be the case that the decision is made for the right reasons. Furthermore, they argue that this requirement holds regardless of how much good is produced by said action. In this essay I argue that their argument is flawed, in that it mistakes what (...) makes an agent morally good for what makes an act morally good. I argue that the main thrust of Purves et al.’s argument in fact undermines the conclusion they wish to draw, and that the reasons for one’s action do not make an in principle difference to the morality of actions in war. I further argue that this position undermines the traditional ad bellum just war constraint of right intention, and that the morality of actions in war is, at core, only concerned with outcomes. I conclude by clarifying that one’s reasons for action do in fact matter when deciding to enter war or kill in war, but only because one’s reasons significantly impact the way in which one acts. The purpose of this paper is to clear the theoretical space by showing why intentions/reasons do not in principle matter when assessing the morality of war (or killing), but this should not be taken as an argument that we should ignore intentions/reasons altogether. (shrink)

Worsening energy crises and the growing effects of climate change have spurred, among other things, concerted efforts to tackle global problems through what the United Nations calls Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). These are in turn argued to be best achieved via the adoption of environmental, social, and corporate governance (ESG) as the vehicle for guiding our efforts. However, though these things are often presented as the solution to global issues, they are increasingly being used as a means to centralize power (...) and exacerbate growing authoritarian trends. This article aims to demonstrate how the narratives surrounding ESG mask this reality, taking as a solution one of the foundational causes of global wealth and power disparity. (shrink)

Are properties perfectly natural (or not) relative to worlds, or are they perfectly natural (or not) tout court? That is, could there be a property P that is instanti-ated at worlds w1 and w2, and is perfectly natural at w1 but not at w2? Here, we offer an original argument for the non-world-relativity of perfect naturalness. Along the way, we reply to a prima facie compelling argument for the contin-gency of perfect naturalness, based upon the connection between natural prop-erties and (...) laws of nature. (shrink)

Objective: Compassion has been associated with eudaimonia and prosocial behavior, and has been regarded as a virtue, both historically and cross-culturally. However, the psychological study of compassion has been limited to laboratory settings and/or standard survey assessments. Here, we use an experience sampling method (ESM) to compare naturalistic assessments of compassion with standard assessments, and to examine compassion, its variability, and associations with eudaimonia and prosocial behavior. -/- Methods: Participants took a survey which included standard assessments of compassion and eudaimonia. (...) Then, over four days, they were repeatedly asked about their level of compassion, eudaimonia, and situational factors within the moments of daily life. Finally, prosocial behavior was tested using the Dual Gamble Task and an opportunity to donate task winnings. -/- Results: Analyses revealed within-person associations between ESM compassion and eudaimonia. ESM compassion also predicted eudaimonia at the next ESM time point. While not impervious to situational factors, considerable consistency was observed in ESM compassion in comparison with eudaimonia. Further, ESM compassion along with eudaimonia predicted donating behavior. Standard assessments did not. -/- Conclusion: Consistent with virtue theory, some individual’s reports displayed a probabilistic tendency toward compassion, and ESM compassion predicted ESM eudaimonia and prosocial behavior toward those in need. (shrink)

In December 2013, the Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) filed a petition for a common law writ of habeas corpus in the New York State Supreme Court on behalf of Tommy, a chimpanzee living alone in a cage in a shed in rural New York (Barlow, 2017). Under animal welfare laws, Tommy’s owners, the Laverys, were doing nothing illegal by keeping him in those conditions. Nonetheless, the NhRP argued that given the cognitive, social, and emotional capacities of chimpanzees, Tommy’s confinement constituted (...) a profound wrong that demanded remedy by the courts. Soon thereafter, the NhRP filed habeas corpus petitions on behalf of Kiko, another chimpanzee housed alone in Niagara Falls, and Hercules and Leo, two chimpanzees held in research facilities at Stony Brook University. Thus began the legal struggle to move these chimpanzees from captivity to a sanctuary, an effort that has led the NhRP to argue in multiple courts before multiple judges. The central point of contention has been whether Tommy, Kiko, Hercules, and Leo have legal rights. To date, no judge has been willing to issue a writ of habeas corpus on their behalf. Such a ruling would mean that these chimpanzees have rights that confinement might violate. Instead, the judges have argued that chimpanzees cannot be bearers of legal rights because they are not, and cannot be persons. In this book we argue that chimpanzees are persons because they are autonomous. (shrink)

A summary of Schopenhauer's reception in British philosophy, culture, literature, and scholarship.

Man könnte behaupten, dass die erste wirklich unparteiische Rezeption Schopenhauers in Großbritannien zu finden ist. In Deutschland sah sich die Berufselite der Philosophie schließlich erst zum Antworten auf Schopenhauer provoziert, als die Parerga und Paralipomena ein allgemeines und weit verbreitetes Interesse gewannen, welches Schopenhauer durch keine seiner vorigen Publikationen erfahren hatte. Doch die Einschätzungen dieser Akademiker gefielen Schopenhauer nicht.

Les Cahiers philosophiques de Strasbourg 52 contains an Introduction and 9 new research articles in French & English on Friedrich Schiller's philosophy in relation to German Idealism. All fully available online on Open-Edition and as free e-book. -/- Edited and introduced by Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel, & David W. Wood. With contributions by Frederick C. Beiser, María del Rosario Acosta López, Cody Staton, Jeremy D. Hovda, Laure Cahen-Maurel, Quentin Landenne, Katia Hay, Louis Carré, and Charlotte Morel. -/- SOMMAIRE / CONTENTS (...) -/- Introduction: Friedrich Schiller, a German Idealist? (Henny Blomme, Laure Cahen-Maurel & David W. Wood) -/- 1. Frederick C. Beiser. Schiller’s Humanism -/- 2. María del Rosario Acosta López. Une dimension esthétique de la critique : la temporalité du beau dans les lettres de Schiller Sur l’éducation esthétique -/- 3. Cody Staton. In Search of Play: Schiller’s Drive Theory as a Turn Away from Kant -/- 4. Jeremy D. Hovda. Bildung between Kant and Schiller -/- 5. Laure Cahen-Maurel. Fichte avec Schiller : La querelle des Heures à la lumière de Grâce et Dignité -/- 6. Quentin Landenne. La Bildung chez Schiller et Fichte, entre esthétique et politique -/- 7. Katia Hay. On the Tragic-Sublime and Tragic Freedom: Thinking with Schiller and Schelling -/- 8. Louis Carré. Vicissitudes de l’État organique : Kant, Hegel, Schiller -/- 9. Charlotte Morel. Conjoindre idéalisme et réalisme après Hegel : Les lectures de Schiller par Lotze et Lange -/- Résumés / Abstracts. (shrink)

If there is to be any progress in the debate about what sort of positive moral status Kant can give the emotions, we need a taxonomy of the terms Kant uses for these concepts. It used to be thought that Kant had little room for emotions in his ethics. In the past three decades, Marcia Baron, Paul Guyer, Barbara Herman, Nancy Sherman, Allen Wood and others have argued otherwise. Contrary to what a cursory reading of the Groundwork may indicate, Kant (...) thinks the emotions play an important role in the moral life. I want to extend the work of Baron, Guyer, Herman, Sherman and Wood in three ways. First, I will set out in a diagram Kant's taxonomy of feelings and emotions. Agreement on such a taxonomy should make it easier to evaluate debates about Kant and the emotions. Second, I will focus on a certain subclass of emotions – reason-caused affects – that have previously received little attention, even from these Kant scholars. Third, these scholars base much of their defence of Kant on his later works – especially the Metaphysics of Morals and the Anthropology – but Kant's fairly rich taxonomy of the emotions, including reason-caused affects, is clearly in place at least as early as the Critique of Judgment . I believe that the Critique of Judgment is an importantly ignored resource for understanding the moral role of the emotions for Kant. The third Critique makes positive, philosophically interesting claims about the emotions and morality. Kant emphasizes certain roles for emotions in this work that he develops to the same extent nowhere else. Nevertheless, the Critique of Judgment goes all but unmentioned by many who write on these issues. In what follows, I will defend as many of my claims as possible using the third Critique. (shrink)

This text examines the socio-professional guidance of Comorian migrants residing on La Réunion Island. It mainly questions the process whereby guidance is constructed as a professional situation. To apprehend the complexity of the process, we have drawn on an ethnographical procedure (Woods, 1990) based on a dual source of data—that of the guide and that of the guided—as well as a micro-sociological approach (Thomas, 1923 ; Goffman, 1993 ; Lapassade, 1997) allowing us to link the concepts of situation definition (...) and conflict in situation definition. Finally, the article mobilizes an intercultural approach (Abdallah-Pretceille, 2003 ; Clanet, 1990 ; Camilleri, 1993) which, in reference to a threefold subjectivist, interactionist and situational perspective, aims to shed light on the dimensions of guidance that are otherness and heterogeneity. Ce texte traite de l’accompagnement socioprofessionnel des migrants comoriens résidant dans l’île de La Réunion. Il questionne principalement le processus de construction de l’accompagnement en tant que situation professionnelle. Pour appréhender la complexité de ce processus, nous avons convoqué une démarche ethnographique (Woods, 1990) privilégiant une double entrée : celle de l’accompagnateur et celle de l’accompagné, une approche microsociologique (Thomas, 1923 ; Goffman, 1993 ; Lapassade, 1997) permettant d’articuler les concepts de définition de la situation et de conflit de définition de la situation et enfin une approche interculturelle (Abdallah-Pretceille, 2003 ; Clanet, 1990 ; Camilleri, 1993) visant à élucider, en référence à une triple perspective : subjectiviste, interactionniste et situationnelle, les dimensions altéritaire et hétérogène de l’accompagnement. (shrink)

We define a formal semantics of conditionals based on _normatively ideal worlds_. Such worlds are described informally by Armgardt (Gabbay D, Magnani L, Park W, Pietarinen A-V (eds) Natural arguments: a tribute to john woods, College Publications, London, pp 699–708, 2018) to address well-known problems of the counterfactual approach to causation. Drawing on Armgardt’s proposal, we use iterated conditionals in order to analyse causal relations in scenarios of multi-agent interaction. This results in a refined counterfactual approach to causal responsibility (...) in legal contexts, which solves overdetermination problems in an intuitively accessible manner. (shrink)

이 책자는 형식 논리의 일종인 양상논리에 입문하고 싶으신 분들을 위한 짧은 교재입니다. “양상논리 맛보기” 라는 말마따나, 이 책자는 양상논리에 관심은 있지만 아직 본격적으로 공부를 시작하진 않은 분들께서 ‘맛보기’를 하기에 적합한 안내 책자입니다. 아무쪼록 이 책자가 양상논리를 공부해나가시는데 유용한 첫 발판이 될 수 있기를 바랍니다. / This booklet is a Korean adaptation and translation of Part VIII of forall x: Calgary (Fall 2021 edition), which is intended to be introductory material for modal logic. The original text is based on Robert Trueman's (...) A Modal Logic Primer, which is revised and expanded by Richard Zach and Aaron Thomas-Bolduc in forall x: Calgary. (forall x: Calgary is based on forall x: Cambridge by Tim Button, which is in turn based on forall x by P. D. Magnus, and also includes material from forall x: Lorain County Remix by Cathal Woods and J. Robert Loftis.) This booklet is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 license. (shrink)

In this book I show that science suffers from a damaging but rarely noticed methodological disease, which I call rationalistic neurosis. It is not just the natural sciences which suffer from this condition. The contagion has spread to the social sciences, to philosophy, to the humanities more generally, and to education. The whole academic enterprise, indeed, suffers from versions of the disease. It has extraordinarily damaging long-term consequences. For it has the effect of preventing us from developing traditions and institutions (...) of learning rationally devoted to helping us learn how to make progress towards a wiser, more civilized world. On our fragile earth, overcrowded, fraught with injustice, inequality and conflict, menaced by unprecedented and terrifying technological and industrial means for change and destruction, we urgently need to acquire a little more wisdom and civilization if we are to avoid repeating horrors of the kind suffered by so many during the 20th century (and already suffered by many in the first few years of the 21st century). We can ill afford to have in our hands instruments of learning botched and bungled from the standpoint of helping us learn how to live more wisely. It may seem scarcely credible that something as important as our institutions of learning can suffer from wholesale, structural defects. Why has this not been noticed before? Why have not armies of scientists and scholars appreciated the point and, long ago, put the matter right? The answer will emerge as my argument unfolds. I will show that one of the most damaging features of rationalistic neurosis is that it has built-in methodological and institutional mechanisms which effectively conceal that anything is wrong. But there is also an immediately obvious reason: specialization, and the resulting fragmentation of academia, has resulted in a situation in which hardly anyone takes responsibility for the overall ideals, the overall aims and methods, of academic inquiry. Academics, these days, are specialists, furiously trying to keep abreast of developments in their own specialist fields. They have no time, and no inducement, to lift their eyes from their particular disciplines, and look at the whole endeavour. Science has long been under attack, at least since the Romantic movement. Blake objected to “Single vision & Newton’s sleep” and declared that “Art is the Tree of Life... Science is the Tree of Death”. Keats lamented that science will “clip an Angel’s wings” and “unweave a rainbow”. Whereas the Enlightenment had valued science and reason as tools for the liberation of humanity, Romanticism found science and reason oppressive and destructive, and instead valued art, imagination, inspiration, individual genius, emotional and motivational honesty rather than careful attention to objective fact. Much subsequent opposition to science stems from, or echoes, the Romantic opposition of Blake, Wordsworth, Keats and many others. There is the movement Isaiah Berlin has described as the “Counter-Enlightenment” (Berlin, 1979, ch. 1). There is existentialism, with its denunciation of the tyranny of reason, its passionate affirmation of the value and centrality of irrationality in human life, from Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre (see, for example, Barrett, 1962). There is the attack on Enlightenment ideals concerning science and reason undertaken by the Frankfurt school, by postmodernists and others, from Horkheimer and Adorno to Lyotard, Foucault, Habermas, Derrida, MacIntyre and Rorty (see Gascardi, 1999). The soul-destroying consequences of valuing science and reason too highly is a persistent theme in literature: it is to be found in the works of writers such as D.H. Lawrence, Doris Lessing, Max Frisch, Y. Zamyatin. There is persistent opposition to modern science and technology, and to scientific rationality, often associated with the Romantic wing of the green movement, and given expression in such popular books as Marcuse’s One Dimensional Man, Roszak’s Where the Wasteland Ends, Berman’s The Reenchantment of the World and Appleyard’s Understanding the Present. There is the feminist critique of science and conceptions of science: see, for example, Fox Keller (1984) and Harding (1986). And there are the corrosive implications of the so-called “strong programme” in the sociology of knowledge, and of the work of social constructivist historians of science, which depict scientific knowledge as a belief system alongside many other such conflicting systems, having no more right to claim to constitute knowledge of the truth than these rivals, the scientific view of the world being no more than an elaborate myth, a social construct (see Barnes and Bloor, 1981; Bloor, 1991; Barnes, Bloor and Henry, 1996; Shapin and Schaffer, 1985; Shapin, 1994; Pickering, 1984; Latour, 1987). This latter literature has provoked a counter-attack by scientists, historians and philosophers of science seeking to defend science and traditional conceptions of scientific rationality: see Gross and Levitt (1994), Gross, Levitt and Lewis (1996), and Koertge (1998). This debate between critics and defenders of science came abruptly to public attention with the publication of Alan Sokal’s brilliant hoax article ‘Transgressing the boundaries’ in a special issue of the cultural studies journal Social Text in 1996 entitled Science Wars: see Sokal and Bricmont (1998). What does this book have to contribute, given the above avalanche of criticism of science? The criticisms of science developed in this book are diametrically opposed to the above, in so far as the above criticisms oppose scientific rationality, seek to diminish or restrict its influence, or hold that it is unattainable. My central point is that we suffer, not from too much scientific rationality, but from not enough. What is generally taken to constitute scientific rationality is actually nothing of the kind. It is rationalistic neurosis, a characteristic, influential and damaging kind of irrationality masquerading as rationality. Science is damaged by being trapped within a widely upheld but severely defective philosophy of science; free science from this defective philosophy, provide it with a more intellectually rigorous philosophy, and it will flourish in both intellectual and humanitarian terms. And more generally, as we shall see, academic inquiry as a whole is damaged by being trapped within an intellectually defective philosophy of inquiry; free it from this defective philosophy, from its rationalistic neurosis, and it will flourish in intellectual and human terms. It is not reason that is damaging, but defective pretensions to reason — rationalistic neurosis —masquerading as reason. Thus what I seek to do here is the exact opposite of what all those who oppose science and scientific rationality do. I shall argue that Reason, the authentic article, arrived at by generalizing the progress-achieving methods of science, can have profoundly liberating and enriching consequences for all worthwhile, problematic aspects of life, and thus deserves to enter into every aspect of life. The bare bones of the argument of this book can be stated quite simply like this. Science cannot proceed without making the substantial metaphysical assumption that the universe is physically comprehensible (to some extent at least). But this conflicts with the orthodox view that in science everything is assessed impartially with respect to evidence, nothing being permanently assumed independently of evidence. So the metaphysical assumption of comprehensibility is repressed. Science pretends that no such assumption is made. But this damages science. For the assumption is substantial, influential and highly problematic. It needs to be made explicit within science so that it can be critically scrutinized, so that alternatives can be developed and considered. Pretending the assumption is not being made undermines the intellectual rigour of science, its intellectual value and success. And it does not stop there. For science also makes value assumptions. Quite properly, science is concerned to discover that which is of value. New factual knowledge devoid of all value (whether intellectual or practical) does not contribute to science. But the orthodox view of science holds that values have no place within science. As in the case of metaphysics, here too, science pretends that values have no role to play within the intellectual domain of science. And this damages science. For values are, if anything, even more influential and problematic than metaphysics (in influencing the direction of research). Here too, values need to be made explicit within science so that they can be scrutinized, so that alternatives can be developed and assessed. Pretending that values play no role within the intellectual domain damages science; both the intellectual and the practical aspects of science are adversely affected. Science fails to pursue those avenues of research that lie in the best interests of humanity. And it goes further. Science is pursued in a social, cultural, economic and political context. It is a part of various social, economic and political projects which seek to achieve diverse human objectives. But the idea that science is an integral part of humanitarian or political enterprises with political ends clashes, once again, with the official view of science that the aim of science is to improve factual knowledge. The political objectives of science are repressed. And, once again, this damages science. For, of course, the political objectives of science, like all our political objectives, are profoundly problematic. These need to be made explicit so that they can be scrutinized, so that alternatives can be developed and considered. The pretence that science does not have this political dimension once again undermines the intellectual rigour of science, and its human value. It lays science open to becoming a part of economic, corporate and political enterprises that are not in the best interests of humanity. The upshot of the line of argument just indicated is that we need to bring about a revolution in the aims and methods of science, and of academic inquiry more generally. Natural science needs to change; its relationship with the rest of academic inquiry, with social inquiry and the humanities, needs to change; and most importantly and dramatically, academic inquiry as a whole needs to change. The basic task of the academic enterprise needs to become to help humanity learn how to tackle its problems of living in more cooperatively rational ways than at present. We need to put the intellectual tasks of articulating our problems of living, and proposing and critically assessing possible solutions, possible and actual actions, at the heart of academic inquiry. The basic task needs to be to help humanity learn a bit more wisdom – wisdom being the capacity to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom including knowledge and technological know-how, but much else besides. Natural science, despite its flaws, has massively increased our knowledge and technological know-how. This in turn has led to a massive and sometimes terrifying increase in our power to act. Often this unprecedented power to act is used for human good, as in medicine or agriculture. But it is also used to cause harm, whether unintentionally (initially at least) as when industrialization and modern agriculture lead to global warming, destruction of natural habitats and rapid extinction of species, or intentionally, as when the technology of war is used by governments and terrorists to maim and kill. Before the advent of modern science, when we lacked the means to do too much damage to ourselves and the planet, lack of wisdom did not matter too much. Now, with our unprecedented powers to act, bequeathed to us by science, lack of wisdom has become a menace. This is the crisis behind all the other current global crises: science without wisdom. In these circumstances, to continue to pursue knowledge and technological know-how dissociated from a more fundamental quest for wisdom can only deepen the crisis. As a matter of urgency, we need to free science and academia of their neuroses; we need to bring about a revolution in the academic enterprise so that the basic aim becomes to promote wisdom by intellectual and educational means. At present science and the humanities betray both reason and humanity. The argument of this book, which I have just summarized, begins with a discussion of the philosophical and methodological problems that beset theoretical physics. At once, many of those who are concerned about moral, political and environmental issues that plague our world today, will feel impatient. What have the methodological problems of theoretical physics to do with third world poverty, war and the threat of war, pollution, extinction of species, the menace of conventional, chemical, biological and nuclear armaments? I can only plead with such a reader: patience. The root cause of the sickness of our times does indeed lie, I claim, with a methodological sickness of natural science or, even more specifically, of physical science. What makes the modern world so utterly different from all previous ages is our possession of modern science and technology. This is the instrument that has changed the conditions of human life almost beyond all recognition, and put unprecedented, and sometimes terrifying, powers into our hands. One should not dismiss out of hand the suggestion that a part of our problem may lie with this instrument, this engine, of rapid change. We see, here, too, the way in which intellectual specialization, referred to above, has effectively concealed from view the nature and extent of the problem that confronts us. The argument that I shall develop in what follows begins with physics, with problems concerning the aims and methods of physics. But it then leaps to social science, to philosophy, to the humanities, to education, to psychotherapy, and to politics: in the end there is scarcely an aspect of modern life that is not touched and, potentially, affected by the argument. How many academic experts are prepared to follow, to take seriously, an argument that ranges so recklessly across such a wide range of academic disciplines? How many non-academic non-experts? But just this is what the argument and message of this book requires. I hope that the reader will endure with patience the somewhat esoteric discussion concerning the aims and methods of physics pursued in chapter one. This may not seem to have anything much to do with the urgent problems of our times, but it does. This is in part how the intellectual disaster I seek to expose in this book conceals itself from view: it buries itself in the obscure, recondite field of the philosophy of physics. Those who devote their lives to the philosophy of physics are, by and large, too myopic to see how their specialized field of study has anything to do with the great and dreadful humanitarian problems and disasters of our age; and those who are above all concerned with these humanitarian disasters have no time at all for abstruse issues concerning the aims and methods of physics. And so the connection is never made. As it happens, the methodological neurosis of physics, with which we begin in chapter one, is actually a quite simple matter to grasp. It does not require any real knowledge of physics to understand. Indeed, physicists and philosophers of physics are much more likely to find the argument difficult to follow than are non-experts. We non-scientists can stand back and see the whole wood; scientists, trained to think in terms of the current orthodox conception of science, trapped in the thickets of research, will find this much harder to do. In an attempt to take this peculiar circumstance into account, I have arranged the exposition as follows. In chapter one I give a simple exposition of the case for declaring natural science to suffer from what I call "rationalistic neurosis"; this avoids all technicalities, and goes straight to the heart of the matter. In the appendix I tackle a host of more technical objections that may be made to the elementary argument of chapter one. So, those experts in the fields of the philosophy of physics and philosophy of science who find the argument of chapter one naïve and unconvincing, should consult the appendix before tossing the book away in disgust. I write in the hope that there will be a few who will not dismiss out of hand the suggestion that the question of how we are to go about learning how to live in wiser and more civilized ways might have something to learn from scientific learning, and will take the trouble to pursue the line of argument traced out in this book. I write in the hope that these few will grasp just how desperate our situation is, how urgent the need to change the status quo, and will do everything in their power to alert others to the need to heal the methodological sickness from which our institutions and traditions of learning at present suffer. To begin with, we need a campaigning organization, modelled perhaps on "Friends of the Earth", which might be called something like "Friends of Wisdom". (shrink)

...If, in some places, backward science determines the remaining period by the lack of optimism only by the number 123456789, then our progressive science expands it to 987654321, which is eight times more advanced than theirs. However, due to the inherent caution of scientists, both sides do not specify the measuring unit of reference — year, day, hour or minute are meant. Leonid Leonov. Collected Op. in ten volumes. Volume ten. M.: IHL, 1984, p.583. -/- The modern men being as (...) a rule is proceeding in three relatively autonomous, but immanently coexisting, and each penetrating dialectically through other, and each contesting even cruelly with other, and each more or less dominating on other, differently in various societies, worlds: the first one of the barbarity, the second one the culture, the third one the civilization... Barbarity is the mode of coexistence of autonomous human societies based on the unlimited will to act so as subject wants to do without any limitations of his activities... Culture is the mode of coexistence of autonomous human societies based on the most ancient testaments, customs, traditions etc of the highestly sacrified appearence... Civilisation is the mode of coexistence of autonomous human societies based on the reasoned or legitimated by social contracts, by profits, by expediency and so more constitutions, institutions etc... -/- Andrei Melnikov-Pechersky in his epic "In the Woods" says that there was a movement among the Old Believers in Russia, or a current that proclaimed Kostroma the new and, it seems, the only true Jerusalem, in an apocalyptic sense, of course, which in its spiritual scale was probably not inferior to the Bogomils, shakers, Mormons, or else and the whole Reformation in potential. In Western Europe, every more or less convex nuance of the history of a state or region (even if it is a small San Marino) is overgrown with almost a dozen institutions, not always state ones, by the way, in which almost every sneeze and step of very ambivalent historical subjects in a broad sense is studied. Especially in the young, but very pretentious America of the United States, which embodies all world justice. In our country, for example, even many leading humanitarian specialists do not realize the spiritual value of the Ipatievsky MONASTERY. The Russian writer Boris Shiryaev, who died quite a long time ago and in a very far abroad, devoted a special part of his documentary and artistic epic of wanderings "The Inextinguishable Lampada" to an entertaining and instructive, tragic fate of a kind of village monarchy in some Villages of the Kostroma province (I could not identify the area, and, frankly, I did not really try) in the early years The Soviet government. At the same time, all Russians learn about the French emperor Napoleon almost with their mother's milk how many percent of cyanide potassium was found in his hair, they reflect on Lermontov's "Airship" (probably, just not to "memorize" the imposed "Borodino" by heart). The events, of course, are incomparable, but the fact is significant. The outstanding national artist (if not to say a thinker of the Chesnyakov level) Grigory Pavlovich Kusochkin was glorified wherever, in whatever catalogues he was not included. Paris, London, New York, St. Petersburg, Moscow... To look at some smear of luminaries like Picasso or Modigliani, international tourist routes are organized in the restaurant toilet using the finest marketing technologies, and we did not even know Grigory Pavlovich by sight until, thank God, a series of TV shows on all Russian channels was dedicated to him in one gulp. Why is this happening? Is it a consequence of poverty or the result of the conscious policy of the ruling elite of the country and the world? The regions of the Kostroma Region are Austria, Switzerland, Bavaria, Armenia, Moldova, and Georgia... Georgia! I served in the army there. In this small but very great country, judging even by the appearance of its President Shevardnadze, although it is smaller than the Kostroma region, there are so many different, but Georgian-speaking peoples! Kakhetians, Meskhetians, Imereti, Iveretians, Mingrelians, Khevsurs... Adjarians (mostly Georgian-speaking Muslims) even have their own autonomy. And some peoples are not Georgian—speaking at all — South Ossetians, Abkhazians, Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, even Assyrians. In the Kostroma Region, and in any Russian "province" — not much less: there are plenty of the same Georgians or Armenians everywhere, quite moderate, loyal, and so on. Having, as a rule, their own officially registered associations within the framework of cultural autonomy. Well done! And Israel! He is the only one with all his "illegal" (and I am for the fact that every nation knows better where its ancestral lands are) territories half the size of the Kostroma region. The total number of Jews worldwide, according to the "Soviet Encyclopedic Dictionary" in 1987, is about 14 million. Meanwhile, the fate of Israel is being preoccupied (it is very instructive how he achieved this!) all the united nations of the world. In the Kostroma Region and its diaspora, it seems to everyone, and especially to its semi-migrant, Varangian leadership. I don't care if they build a public atomic bomb here in the form of a nuclear power plant or not. Because they do not know the value of this land, the greatness of its spirit. Kostroma is a holy land. I will immediately make a reservation that by Kostroma I mean not only the modern region, but the entire area that has ever historically been associated with Kostroma. The USSR is also a part of the great historical Russia. In this sense, even the entire era of the Russian Romanov Empire is the Kostroma region. Or: many toponymic objects of our native land are called mysteriously beautiful: Sharya, Shunga, Shekshema, Sholezhka, - we need to find out what kind of peoples — and where are they now? — we left such euphonious archetypal combinations, because these are our Kostromsky peoples, these are our Kostroma people. Or, say, the classic of American and world sociology Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin writes in his autobiographical scientific novel "The Long Way" that he studied at the Khrenovskaya (what a strong word!) teachers' seminary of Kostroma province, but in an administrative row for propaganda activities, gendarmes were taken by sledge to the prison of the city of Kineshma - is this not a fact for Kostroma, and primarily for him, local history, although Kineshma has long been attributed to the Ivanovo region, and Pitirim Alexandrovich is buried on the other side of the planet?! I have not the slightest doubt that Kostroma provided spiritual food, gave birth to and nurtured a huge intellectual diaspora with extremely valuable material on a national, global scale. And this is both in direct and indirect order, in the form of a chain reaction. Apparently, it is easy for an intelligent person to grow up in Kostroma, but it is impossible to live, and somewhere on the contrary. Therefore, it is not surprising that the geneticist academician D. K. Belyaev, who was born in the village of Protasov near Nerekhta, very close to Kostroma, glorified Moscow and Siberia with his discoveries and practical results, which immeasurably enriched the Soviet state treasury with foreign exchange income from the sale of the most valuable fur grown according to the biotechnology developed by him in a much shorter time than it usually turns out in nature. And in Kostroma, most likely, few people know who he is and what he is famous for. I will focus in more detail on one of the aspects of his great life. This happened back in the so-called pre-Perestroika times. In a series of his speeches, Dmitry Konstantinovich, based on the results of his and colleagues' research, emphasized, in his opinion, the determining role of the biological factor in shaping the content of human essence, of course, only in a philosophical, conceptual aspect. For some reason, this was opposed by a geneticist, as they say, persecuted at one time by the "senile" in selectionism (including human nature) by the Michurino-Lysenkoists, academician N. P. Dubinin, which personally remains incomprehensible to me until now. With a grateful curtsey to Academician Dubinin and his point of view, the famous French humanist, member of the Politburo of the French Communist Party Lucien Sav appeared on the pages of the Communist magazine. The material was clearly titled: "Problems are not only scientific, but also political." He very indecently attributed the views of academician Belyaev to "a reactionary ideology that tries to put genetics at its service, and more broadly, biology, in order to present all kinds of social inequalities of all kinds as inherent in nature itself"(1). I would like to see any ideology that does not try to "put this or that at its service," much less something worthwhile... A little later, the editorial of the Communist hit the "biologizers", and soon Dmitry Konstantinovich was gone. In short, it is only on the example of our fellow countrymen that you can write interesting, world-class essays on science and its history, but instead our scientists should fit their global potencies into a page and a half (good yet. if not entirely at their own expense), and then for at least three years to guess whether they will be published or not. Now it no longer surprises me how at one time, when, after reading the listener card I filled out, the sweetest girl from the IPKPON office at USU congratulated me for something. It turned out that the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy of USU, doctor, professor, Honored Scientist, and now academician Konstantin Niko-laevich Lyubutin is a countryman, Kostromsky, or rather Manturovsky by origin, as I write below in the notes — we are Kostromendors. To him, my fellow citizen in the most subtle micropatriotic dimensions, I owe a lot in my professional and social development, even in survival. Because that's how it often turns out: you can be born here, sometimes you can live here... It's very hard. Maybe the Kostroma origin of an outstanding Russian historian of philosophy, organizer of science and education, educator and friend of a galaxy of people devoted to the Motherland and the cause is not a great milestone in the history of the region, but name me at least a dozen Russian cities on the scale of Kostroma, from where such intellectual ones would come out into the world and light luminaries like ours. No matter who you take from the world significance of the pillars of national (and world, and foreign, - even the great Rabbi of Lubavitcher spent three years in exile in a Campfire, — I learned from some foreign voices) history, literature, culture in general, technology, science and so on - you will always find someone, which is very directly related to Kostroma. Pushkin, Lermontov, Gorky. Alexander Nikolaevich Ostrovsky, Pisarev, Uspensky, Katenin, Florensky, Savrasov, Kustodiev, Dyagilev, Mikhalkov, Alexander Alexandrovich Zinoviev; writers, artists, entrepreneurs, revolutionaries, inventors, politicians... In some world-famous for its classic Russian provincialism, Kologriv has been storing, figuratively speaking, unique sketches, if not of Leo-Nardo da Vinci himself, then certainly of his school, almost since the seventeenth century. And not only that. Nevertheless, the well-known Chukhloma to the Fatherland, in addition to thinkers of the rank of Rozanov and Zinoviev (where should domestic philosophers mature and not be born, if not in Chukhloma, Manturov or Khrenknowswhere?), gave an actor of amazing, national, originality — Mikhail Pugovkin, who can not be confused with anyone, a role that no one will repeat. (shrink)

Predication is a lingual relation. We have this relation when a term is said (λέγεται) of another term. This simple definition, however, is not Aristotle’s own definition. In fact, he does not define predication but attaches his almost in a new field used word κατηγορεῖσθαι to λέγεται. In a predication, something is said of another thing, or, more simply, we have ‘something of something’ (ἓν καθ᾿ ἑνὸς). (PsA. , A, 22, 83b17-18) Therefore, a relation in which two terms are posited (...) to each other in a way that one is said (predicated) of the other is a predication. The term of which the other term is said is called a subject (ὑποκειμένον) and the other, which is said about the subject, is called the predicate. Thus, in a predication the predicate is predicated of the subject; given that being predicated is almost as the same as being said. The relation between being said and being predicated is so close that ‘if something is said of a subject both its name and its definition are necessarily predicated of the subject.’ (Cat., 5, 2a19-26) This, however, is true only about the second genera and not the accidents. a) Nature of relation in predication What is Aristotle’s theory about the nature of the relation in a predication? How does he fundamentally understand this relation? Phil Corkum distinguishes between predication logic and traditional term logic and argues that the relation between subject and predicate in Aristotle is of the latter kind. While in predicate logic, subjects and predicates have distinct roles, they have the same role in traditional term logic. In predication logic, subjects refer, but predicates characterize. Thereupon, a sentence expresses a truth if the object to which the subject refers is correctly characterized by the predicate. In traditional term logic, both subjects and predicates refer and a sentences expresses a truth if both name one and the same thing. He concludes that Aristotle ‘problematically conflates prediction and identity claims’ because while he thinks both subjects and predicates refer, he would deny that a sentence is true just in case the subject and the predicate name one and the same thing. Based on this, Corkum believes that Aristotle’s core semantic is not identity but the weaker relation of constitution, which is a mereological interpretation: ‘All men are mortal’ is true just in case the mereological sum of humans is part of the mereological sum of mortals. b) Aristotle’s theory of predication: one or two theories? Frank Lewis finds an inconsistent gap between the theory of predication in the Categories and that in the later books of the Metaphysics VII, 6. So too Joan Kung, Terry Irwin, Daniel Graham. c) Distinction of ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ Owen enumerates the texts in which Aristotle’s distinction between ‘being said of’ and ‘being in’ is asserted: OI. 11b38-12a17; To., 127b1-4; Cat. 1a20-b9; 2a11-14; 2a27-b6; 2b15-17; 3a7-32; 9b22-24 d) Predication in Aristotle and the standard ‘S is P’ Marie De Rijk Lambertus thinks that the ‘S is P’ pattern is misleading when it comes to express predication in Aristotle. In his view, ‘The Aristotelian procedure should be described in terms of appositively assigning an attribute (κατηγορούμενον) to a substrate (ὑποκείμενον), rather than ascribing a predicate to a subject by means of a copula…. The comment should be considered an attribute which is said to fall to a substrate, without understanding this procedure in terms of sentence predication.’ e) Aristotle’s predication: bipartite or tripartite? It is a difficulty to make Aristotle’s theories of name-verb predication and tripartite predication consistent. The reason is that tripartite is not consistant with his name-verb structure based on which he says that the predicate term is the ‘verb.’ (20a31; 20b1-2; 16a13-5) The problem is that in a tripartite form like ‘Socrates is white’ we cannot take ‘is white’ as the verb because, based on Aristotle himself, no part of a verb can be significant itself. (16b6-7) However, his assertions about the equivalences between the two structures (OI. 12, 21b9-10; PrA. 51b13-16; Met., 1017b22-30) must mean that they are not inconsistent in his own view. Thus, as Allen Bāck points, ‘Aristotle seems to think that he has a single, consistent theory.’ The sense of saying or speaking as the root sense of rhema makes the relation between predication (saying something of something) and verb more interesting. The use of rhema in the sense of a long expression approves this. In Plato’s work (399ac) where Socrates claims that the name anthropos derives from anthron ha opopen (‘he who examines what he has seen’) we have an onoma from, or in place of, a rhema. 1) Subject The subject (ὑποκειμένον) is that of which another term is said or predicated. Aristotle’s own definition is of a much more philosophical value: ‘By subject I mean that which is expressed by an affirmative term (λέγω δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ κάταφάσει δηλούμενον).’ (Met., K, 1067b18) Throughout Aristotle’s work, three kinds of subjects can be found: possible, prime and absolute subject. a) Possible subject Those things that can take the position of a subject in a predication we call possible subjects, no matter they can or cannot take the position of predicate in any predication. All terms except the ultimate predicates are possible subjects because they can take the position of subject. b) Prime subject Those that in any predication can only take the position of a subject and not the position of a predicate are prime subjects. (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2; Met., Z, 1028b36-1029a1) This is the truest sense of subject and belongs only to substances. (Met., Z, 1029a1-2) In fact, ‘that which is not predicated of a subject, but of which all else is predicated’ is a substance. (Met., Z, 1029a7-9) In Categories, besides primary substances (Cat., 2, 1b3-6), individual qualities are also said not to be able to be said of anything else. (Cat., 2, 1a23-29) Aristotle’s examples are a certain ‘knowledge-of-grammar’ (τὶς γράμματικὴ) and ‘an individual white’ (τὸ τὶ λευκὸν). Thus, although substances are indeed in the truest sense individuals and, thereby, in the truest sense primary subjects, other individuals can take the position of subject as well. c) Absolute subject While substances are prime subjects of all other things, there is still something of which substances can be predicated and this predication is not an accidental predication: matter. (Met., Z, 1029a21-24) This predication is, indeed, the predication of a ‘form or this’ on matter and material substance. (Met., Θ, 1049a34-36) The only thing that is absolutely a subject, therefore, and can be a predicate is prime matter (πρώτη ὓλη). (Met., Θ, 1049a24-27) d) Subject and substance The most important thing in being a substance is being a subject: ‘It is because the primary substances are subjects for all the other things and all the other things are predicated of them or are in them, that they are called substances most of all.’ (Cat., 5, 2b15-17) And what is nearer to this position is more a substance as a species is more a substance than a genus.’ (Cat., 5, 2b7-8) e) Primary versus accidental subject A subject is a primary subject in a predication when the predicate is predicated of it as itself. In such a case, the subject is the subject of the predicate qua itself and not qua something else. A subject, on the one hand, is an accidental subject when it is not the primary subject of the predicate that is predicated on it. It means that a subject is an accidental subject when the predicate is predicated of it not qua itself but qua something else. An accidental subject is, therefore, anything other than a substance. 2) Predicate as universal It is evident from our discussion of kinds of subjects that except matter, primary substances (if we ignore both accidental predication and cases of absolute subjects) and other individuals, everything else can take the position of a predicate. Since primary substances are individuals, it results that everything except matter and individuals are capable to take the position of predicate. The immediate consequence of this is that the predicate must be a universal. When individuals cannot take the position of predicate, this position cannot be taken by any particular. Therefore, only universals can be predicated of others. Moreover, albeit universals can be a simple subject (for another universal), they are not prime subjects. The closeness of universal and predicate is to the extent that Aristotle differentiates universal from subject. (Met., Θ, 1049a27-30) 3) Categories or classes of predicates Aristotle distinguishes ten highest classes into one of which each predicate must necessarily fall: substance (or what a thing is), quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, activity and passivity. (Cat., 4, 1b25-27; To., I, 9, 103b20- ; PsA., A, 22, 83b13-23) The substance counted among predicates must refer to secondary and not primary substances not only because Aristotle insists that primary substances cannot be predicated but also from his own examples of the category of substance: man and animal. (To., I, 9, 103b25) However, if a predicate be asserted of itself or its genus be asserted of it, the predicate signifies substance or what is; but if ‘one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind,’ it signifies one of the other nines. (To., I, 9, 103b30) These categories are so comprehensive that no predicate can remain outside them so that even non-being has as many senses as categories. (Met., M, 1089a26-30) a) That whether Aristotle’s categories are merely linguistic or fundamentally ontological is a so much controversial dispute. Some like G. E. R. Lloyd believe that ‘categories are primarily intended as a classification of reality … rather than of the signifying terms themselves.’ b) Although Aristotle’s categories have been historically regarded as a classification of predications, there are some recent commentators like Jonathan Barnes that think it is classifying predicates and not predications. 4) Kinds of predicates In his introduction of Categories, as J. W. Thorp truly points out , Aristotle distinguishes between the category of substance and the other categories using μὲν ... δὲ construction. This construction illustrates that beside tenfold classification of categories, there is an even more crucial differentiation between two kinds of predicates: substance or what is on the one hand and the other nine ones on the other hand: the distinction between what is predicated of the subject as what it is and what is predicated of it as an accident. Therefore, we have three kinds of classification - a twofold, a fourfold and a tenfold-complicatedly classifying the same thing, viz. the predicate. Predicates can be divided also to four kinds: property, definition, genus and accident. (To., I, 4, 101b11-20) A property is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and does not signify its essence. A definition is that predicate that is convertible with its subject and signifies its essence. It is a genus if it is not predicated convertibly and is contained in the definition of its subject. And it is an accident if it is neither convertible nor contained in the definition of its subject. (To., I, 8, ^103b3) All of these four kinds are among categories. (To., I, 9, 103b20) It seems that there might be some kind of relation between the twofold and the fourfold distinction: whereas genus and definition are predicated as what it is, accidents are not so predicated. There seems to be some rules that determine to each of these four kinds each predicate belongs. At To., IV, 123b30ff. Aristotle asserts: ‘If B has a contrary and A does not, then B does not belong to A as its genus.’ There is a dispute around per se accidents (τὰ καθ’ αὑτὰ συμβεβηκότα) (Topics., 102a18) whether they must be regarded as either of the four kinds or as a fifth kind. Barnes (1970) argued that they ‘do not fit at all neatly into the fourfold classification.’ He argues that based on the definition of accidents at A, 5, 102b4-5, they must be accidents but based on another definition, A, 5, 102b6-7, they cannot be accidents. He also defends the view that they are not properties. Barnes concludes: ‘This shows that the two definitions are not equivalent, and hence that the ‘predicables’ are not well-defined.’ Demetris J. Hadgopoulos defends the view that the two definitions of accidents are equivalent and per se accidents are properties. 5) Five types of predications We have five kinds of predications based on our division of subjects and our discussion of predicates: simple, primary (itself divided to substantial and accident), accidental (itself divided to primary and secondary), aoincidental and absolute predication. a) Simple predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of either a particular or a universal subject. This sense of predication includes all other senses except the first kind of accidental predication. b) Primary predication. This is a predication in which a universal is predicated of a primary subject, namely a substance. A primary predication is of two kinds: i) Substantial predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is part of, or is included in, the definition of the subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the definition or the genus or the species or the diferentia of the subject. It is this predication that Aristotle calls a unity: ‘A statement may be called a unity … because it exhibits a single predicate as inhering not accidentally in a single subject.’ (PsA., B, 10, 93b35-37) It is only substantial predicates that can be predicated of each other: ‘Predicates which are not substantial are not predicated of one another.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b18-19) Aristotle defines a substantial predication also in another way. A predication in which a higher genus is predicated on a lower genus, species, a substance or an individual, (or a species is predicated on an individual) is a substantial predication. Therefore, a substantial predication is a predication in a series that has individuals on one of its ends and a general category on its other end. In fact, only substantial predicates can be predicated of one another. (PsA., A, 22, 83b17-19) This series cannot be an infinite series because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) -/- ii) Accident predication. A primary predication in which the predicate is not part of, or is not included in, the definition of its subject. The universal that is the predicate here is the property or the accident of the subject. c) Accidental predication. This is a predication in which the subject is not a primary subject and its predicate is a substance. This predication is of two kinds: i) Primary accidental predication. This is a predication in which an accident is predicated of substance. Such a predication can go ad infinitum, which is inferable from Aristotle’s assertion that the secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum. ii) Secondary accidental predication. It is a predication in which an accident is predicated of another accident. Such a predication, Aristotle asserts, cannot go ad infinitum because even more than two accidents cannot be combined. Now what is the meaning of Aristotle’s assertion that we cannot continue this ad infinitum? Does it mean that we cannot continue the predication ‘The musician is white’ and say ‘The white is Athenian?’ But why not? Or maybe he means that by adding any predication, we are still in a condition of predicating two accidents of a substance on each other. -/- As primary subjects, substances can also take the position of predicate though not essentially but accidentally. In propositions like ‘the white is a log’ or ‘That big thing is a log’ we observe substance taking the position of predicate but this is only accidentally: ‘When I affirm ‘the white is a log,’ I mean that something which happens to be white is a log- not that white is the subject in which log inheres (οὐχ ὡς τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῷ ξύλῳ τὸ λευκόν ἐστι), for it was not qua white or qua a species of white that the white (thing) came to be a log (οὔτε λευκὸν ὄν οὔθ᾿ ὃπερ λευκόν τι ἐγἐνετο ξύλον), and the white (thing) is consequently not a log except incidentally.’ (PsA., 22, 83a3-9) Aristotle compares this accidental use of substance in the position of predicate with the substantial use of it in the place of a subject: ‘On the other hand, when I affirm ‘the log is white,’ I do not mean that something else, which happens to be a log, is white (οὐχ ὃτι ἓτερόν τί ἐστι λευκόν, ἐκείνῳ δὲ συμβέβηκε ξύλῳ εἶναι), (as I should if I said ‘the musician is white,’ which would mean ‘The man who happens also to be a musician is white’); on the contrary, log is here the subject- the subject which actually came to be white, and did so qua wood or qua a species of wood and qua nothing else.’ (PsA., 22, 83a8-14) Aristotle asks us not to call propositions like ‘The white is a log’ a predication at all or at least call them accidental predication instead of simple (ἁπλως) predication. (PsA., A, 22, 83a14-17) An accidental predication, in which we have a substance in the place of predicate, is different from an essential predication in that while the subject of an accidental predication is said to be the predicate not by itself but as something different with which it coincides, the subject of an essential predicate is said to be the predicate by itself and not because it is something else: ‘Since there are attributes which are predicated of a subject essentially and not accidentally- not, that is, in the sense in which we say ‘That white (thing) is a man,’ which is not the same mode of predication as when we say ‘The man is white’: the man is white not because he is something else but because he is man, but the white is man because ‘being white’ coincides with ‘humanity’ within one subject. Therefore, there are terms such as are essentially subjects of predicates. (PsA., A, 19, 81a24-29) This capability of ‘non-essentially and only accidentally’ being a subject does belong, in fact, to all sensible things. (PsA., A, 27a32-36) d) Coincidental predication. this is a predication in which none of the subject and predicate are a substance or an individual. In this predication, one of the accidents of a substance or individual is predicated of one of the other accidentals of the same substance or individual. For example, when it is said that ‘The white is musical,’ there is an individual, say Socrates, for which both of white and musical are accidents. e) Absolute predication. This is a predication in which a form or a substance is predicated of a matter or a material substance. Some commentators like Loux and Lewis regarded this predication as close to accident predication, both based on inherence. As R.M. Dancy points out, these predications make Aristotle’s theory of predication immanentist: not only accident predications are explained by the immanence of accidents in substances, some of the substantial predications, which were not explained in Categories, are also explained by the immanence of form in matter. It is interesting that in this kind of predication, it is the predicate and not the subject, which is in the strictest sense substance. As the central books of Metaphysics claim, the form is the substance. Thus, in this predication, substance gets away from the sense of ὑποκείμενον. Corkum mentiones 68a19 as the only instance where Aristotle explicitly claims that a term may be predicated of itself, a passage that is, in Corkum’s view, problematic. 6) Demonstrable predicates Those predicates are demonstrable that are so related to their subjects that there are other predicates prior to them predicable of their subjects (ἔτι δ᾿ ἄλλος, εἰ ὧν πρότερα ἄττα κατηγορεῖται). (PsA., A, 22, 83b32-34) 7) Series of predications Since it is possible for a predicate to be itself the subject of another predication, we can have a series of predications in which the predicate of a predication is the subject of the next predication. This series has the following features: a) It has a limit (in number) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) on the side of subjects: there are subjects that cannot themselves be predicated (PsA., A, 27, 43a39-41), which are, as we noted, prime subjects: particulars, i.e. prime substances and other individuals. (PsA., A, 19-22) Aristotle calls them ultimate (ὓστατον). (PsA., 21, 82a36-b1) b) It has a limit (in number of kinds) (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) also on the side of predicates: there must be predicates that cannot be subjects. (PsA., A, 19-22; PsA., A, 27, 43a36-39) Aristotle calls them primary (πρῶτον). (PsA., A, 21, 82b1-4) These are the highest categories or the highest genera of categories. (PsA., A, 22, 83b14-16) c) The series has an escalating shape from mere subjects at its downside to mere predicates at its upside. It is Aristotle himself whos uses the words up and down in this sense. (e.g. PsA., A, 22, 83b2-3) d) The predications that lie between lowest and highest ones must be finite in number. (PsA., A, 19-22 especially: 20, 82a21-35) These have subjects and predicates, each capable of both of the roles of being subject and being predicated. A result of this fitness is that neither demonstration can go to infinity nor everything is demonstrable, the two points Aristotle always insist on. e) The upward side includes the more universal ones and the downward the more particular ones. (PsA., 20, 82a21-23) f) It follows from the above features that ‘neither the ascending nor the descending series of predications … are infinite.’ (PsA., A, 22, 83b24-25) g) Reciprocation and convertibility. Except in case of terms (i.e. subjects and predicates) that are at each of the ends of series of predications, namely ultimates and primaries, it is possible to reciprocate (ἀντιστρέφειν) terms and convert the predication. (PsA., A, 19, 82a15-20) h) Antipredication. Antipredication means that in a predication (S is P), the subject becomes the predicate of its predicate (P is S) in the same category its predicate was predicated on it. For example, if P is in the category of quality, antipredication means that S be predicated of P in the category of quality. In other words, P is a quality of S and S is a quality of P. Aristotle rejects this. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-b3) i) Self-predication versus other-predication. Aristotle distinguishes between a predication in which a term is said of itself and a predication in which a term is said of another. (Phy., Δ, 2, 209a31-33) j) Predicablity (Cat., 5, 3a36-b2): 1) Primary substances and individuals are not predicable. 2) Secondary substances are of two kinds: genus and species i) Genus is predicable able both of the species and of the individuals. ii) Species is predicable of the individual. 3) Differentiae are predicable both of the species and of the individuals. 8) Predication as classification a) Richard Patterson believes that Aristotle’s so repeated construction using hoper (estin A hoper B) in Topics (120a23 sq., 122b19, 26sq., 123a, 124a18, 125a29, 126a21, 128a35. Also in Posterior Analytics (83a24-30) (Brunschwig’s list. ‘expresses the fact that A is a kind of B (esti A B tis), that A is a species of the genus B.’ 9) Universal predication Aristotle defines universal predication (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι) as such: ‘wherever no instance of the subject (τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμέμνου) can be found of which the other term cannot be asserted.’ (PrA., A, 24b27-29) In this predication, the subject is included in another as in a whole (ἐν ὃλῳ εἶναι) and the predicate is predicated of all of the subject (κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι). (PrA., A, 24b26-27) Attach another discussion we had about ἐν ὃλῳ here. 10) Quantity of predication A predication, truly stated, has a quantity, which is the number of objects under the name of the subject of which the predicate is predicated. The quantity of subject can be stated in four ways: a. Indefinite: when the predicate belongs or does not belong to the subject without any mark to show to haw many of the particulars under the name of the subject it does or does not belong. E.g. ‘Man is white’; ‘Man is not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a20; OI., I, 7, 17b8-12) b. Universal quantity: When the predicate belongs to all or none of the subject. E.g. ‘Every man is animal’; ‘No man is animal.’ (PrA., A, 24a18-19; OI., I, 7, 17b5-6) The contrary of a predication of a universal quality is a predication of a universal quality. E.g. the contrary of ‘Every man is white’ is ‘No man is white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b20-23) c. Particular quantity: When the predicate belongs (or does not belong) to some of the subject. E.g. ‘Some men are white’; ‘Some men are not white.’ (PrA., A, 24a19-20) d. Single quantity: when the subject is a proper name of only one object. E.g. ‘Socrates is white’; ‘Socrates is not white.’ The contrary of this predication is of a single quantity: ‘Socrates is not white.’ (OI., I, 7, 17b38-18a4) 11) Convertibility of predication. Some predications are convertible, that is, it is possible to change the place of subject and predicate in a true proposition so that the converted proposition remains true. This is supposed to mean that given the truth of a predication, the truth of the converted predication is inferable. The convert form of a predication depends on its quantity. a. Indefinite quantity: This predication has no strictly true convert because its quantity is not stated. b. Universal quantity: It can be converted in two ways: i) A negative universal can be converted to a negative universal in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘No pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘No good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a5-8 and a14-19) ii) An affirmative universal can be converted to an affirmative particular in which the terms are changed. E.g. ‘Every pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a7-9) c. Particular quantity: If it is negative, it cannot be converted but if it is affirmative, it can be converted to an affirmative predication with particular quantity. E.g. ‘Some pleasure is good’ can be converted to ‘Some good is pleasure.’ (PrA., A, 2, 25a10-13 and a20-24) d. Single quantity: It cannot be converted. 12) Characteristics of relations between subject and predicate 1. A predicate is of a wider range than its subject. It is based on this fact that Aristotle: a) Prevents individuals to be predicate because there is nothing of which an individual be of a wider range. In other words, it is due to the fact that since an individual is only ‘one particular’ thing and, thus, cannot be of a wider extent than anything that Aristotle prevents them of being a predicate. Matthews, however, thinks we cannot use Socrates, a substance and an individual, in the place of predicate and say it of Socrates because ‘Socrates does not classify Socrates: it names him.’ b) Prevents differentia, species and things under species to be predicated of genus. (To., Z, 6, 144a27-) c) Prevents the species and the things under it to be predicated of the differentia. (To., Z, 6, 144b1-4) d) Also about the effect because it is wider than its subject. (PsA., B, 17, 99a) e) Each attribute is wider than every individual it is predicated on, though several attributes, collectively considered, might not be wider but exactly the substance of a thing. (PsA., B, 13, 96a32-b1) 2. The predicate of a predicate of a subject will be predicated of the subject too: ‘whenever one thing is predicated of another as of a subject, all things said of what is predicated will be said of the subject too.’ (Cat., 3, 1b10-15) In fact, it is due to its predication of the subject that it is predicated of its predicate. (Cat., 5, 2a36-b1) Moreover, what is not predicated of the predicate of a subject cannot be predicated of it as well. (PrA., A, 27, 43b22-27) Thus, what, for example, is not predicated of animal, cannot be predicated of man. 3. The predicate of a subject can be predicated of its predicates as well. (Cat., 5, 3a1-6) For example, you call the individual man grammatical and, thence, you call both a man and an animal grammatical. Nonetheless, the predicate of a subject belongs to it more properly than to its higher predicates. (PrA., A, 27, 43a27-32) 4. It is only the subject that can be distributed and not the predicate. (PrA., A, 27, 43b16-22; OI, I, 7, 17b12-16) Therefore, we can say e.g. ‘Every man is animal’ but we cannot say ‘Every man is every animal.’ 5. It is the reason of the relation between subjects and predicates, that is the reason of predication, which is the subject of inquiry. (Met., Z, 1041a20-24) In other words, since it is a meaningless inquiry to ask why a thing is itself (Met., Z, 1041a14-15), the only remaining meaningful inquiry is to ask why something is something else, i.e. to ask about the reason of predication. 6. A subject cannot categorize its predicate in the same category in which it is categorized by it. If e.g. A is a quality of B, B cannot be a quality of A. Therefore, there is no reciprocation in the same category. (PsA., A, 22, 83a36-39) 13) Characteristics of series of predications 1. A series of secondary accidental predication cannot go ad infinitum for not even more than two terms can be comnbined. For an accident is not an accident of an accident, unless it be because both are accidents of the same subject. (Met., Γ, 1007b1-4) 2. Infinite series cannot be traversed in thought. (PsA., A, 22, 83b6-7) 3. The predications of genera on each other must be ended and cannot go to infinity because otherwise not only substances would not be definable but also a genus would be equal to one of its own species. (PsA., A, 22, 83b7-10) Therefore, a series of predication of genera on each other must be limited on both sides. There must be an upward limit in general categories as well as a downward limit in individual because they cannot be predicated of others. Whatever lies between these limits can both be predicated of others and others be predicated of them. (PrA., A, 27, 43a36-43) 4. The order of predicates matters: it makes a difference whether the series be ABC or BAC. (PsA., B, 13, 96b25-32) . (shrink)

OBJETIVO A gestação nos mamíferos domésticos é um processo fisiológico que implica mudanças físicas, metabólicas e hormonais na fêmea, que culminam com o nascimento de um novo indivíduo. Desta forma, a compreensão de tais mudanças e como estas favorecem um ambiente ideal de desenvolvimento embrionário inicial, até a placentação e a fisiologia envolvidas durante esses processos é fundamental na tomada de decisões quanto à saúde reprodutiva da fêmea, na seleção de futuras matrizes e até mesmo para a saúde fetal e (...) sanidade do novo animal. Neste capítulo, o estudante compreenderá de forma clara, concisa, didática e objetiva, as adaptações maternas e fetais para o estabelecimento da gestação após a fecundação, o desenvolvimento desta e também identificará as diferenças existentes entre as espécies de interesse zootécnico. INTRODUÇÃO O estabelecimento da gestação nos mamíferos domésticos inclui três etapas fundamentais: o reconhecimento materno da gestação ou prenhez (RMP), a implantação e a placentação. Dentro da fisiologia da reprodução nos mamíferos, a implantação e a placenta- ção constituem processos essenciais na nutrição do embrião e do feto e, portanto, para seu desenvolvimento; devido a isso, são etapas críticas para a produção animal já que possuem um efeito direto sobre a eficiência reprodutiva. Nos bovinos leiteiros, por exemplo, estima-se uma taxa de fertilização perto de 95%, embora apenas 55% desses zigotos se desenvolvam e cheguem ao parto, o qual representa uma perda de gestações perto de 35%. Entre 70% e 80% das mortes embrionárias ocorrem durante as três semanas seguintes à ovulação, o que coincide com o período no qual se estabelecem os processos de implantação e placentação supracitados. O desenvolvimento embrionário precoce depende da sincronia de eventos entre o oviduto-útero e o embrião. Foi determinado que a presença do embrião pode modificar as secreções ovidutais e uterinas durante as fases iniciais de desenvolvimento. O ambiente endócrino materno (predominância de progesterona) também modula as características das secreções ovidutais e uterinas para assegurar a sobrevivência embrionária no caso da fertilização ter sido bem sucedida. Se este último ocorrer, então o embrião deverá indicar à mãe a sua existência para que sejam mantidas as condições adequadas ao seu desenvolvimento. Como supracitado, o embrião em seu curso pelo oviduto requer certas secreções para sobreviver e desenvolver-se, no entanto, graças à fertilização in vitro, têm-se dispensado a importância das secreções ovidutais, já que se observou que um embrião é capaz de se desenvolver em condições laboratoriais fora do aparelho reprodutor materno durante as suas fases iniciais, e consegue estabelecer uma gestação normal que chega a termo após a sua reintrodução no útero. Em estágios mais tardios de desenvolvimento o embrião necessita necessariamente do meio uterino para sobreviver e continuar o seu crescimento. No bovino, por exemplo, o embrião só é capaz de alongar-se estando dentro do útero, indicando a presença de fatores específicos necessários para que o embrião se desenvolva de maneira normal. Um meio endócrino no qual predomina a progesterona materna durante a gestação induz a secreção do histiotrofo (ou leite uterino) que permite a nutrição e a sobrevivência do embrião antes da implantação e da formação da placenta, através do qual obterá a maioria do fornecimento e intercâmbio necessários para continuar o seu desenvolvimento intra-uterino. SEGMENTAÇÃO E DESENVOLVIMENTO EMBRIONÁRIO PRECOCE O desenvolvimento embrionário precoce, conhecido como período de pré- -implantação, é essencial; inclui processos de divisão e diferenciação celular que são realizadas no início com uma elevada sincronização para garantir o desenvolvimento correto do indivíduo dentro do útero. Esta fase envolve a passagem do zigoto (unicelular), a embrião (multicelular) e, por fim, em concepto (quando se distingue o embrião com suas membranas extraembrionárias). O desenvolvimento precoce é o estágio mais dinâmico e vulnerável na formação de um indivíduo. Investigações recentes demonstraram que alterações nesta etapa podem modificar características produtivas ou reprodutivas durante a vida adulta. É por isso que é necessário conhecer as etapas fisiologicamente normais envolvidas neste processo (figura 1). Em fases mais tardias de desenvolvimento, o embrião se converterá em um feto com todos os sistemas e tecidos diferenciados observados num animal adulto. Após a fertilização, o zigoto resultante é capaz de dar origem a um novo organismo completo, de modo que se considera como uma célula totipotencial. O desenvolvimento embrionário começa e se consegue graças a uma série de divisões mitóticas conhecidas como segmentação ou clivagem (cleavage, em inglês). A primeira divisão mitótica dá origem a duas células filhas idênticas (figura 1), e ocorre por volta das 20 às 30 horas depois da fertilização, com divisões subsequentes a cada 12 a 24 h, dependendo da espécie. As células resultantes destas divisões são conhecidas como blastômeros. A orientação da divisão inicial que dá origem aos dois primeiros blastô- meros, parece ser guiada pela posição dos corpos polares. As divisões iniciais das células embrionárias são sincrônicas, no entanto, conforme o desenvolvimento se torna assincrônicas. Assim, a divisão mitótica inicial dá origem a um embrião de duas células (dois blastômeros), a segunda a um embrião de quatro células, a terceira a um de oito células e a quarta a um com 16 células, onde passa a ser chamado de mórula. Estas divisões são realizadas sem o aumento do volume do citoplasma, para que seja restabelecida uma proporção celular mais adequada à das células somáticas, já que o ovócito é a célula mais grande do organismo (um ovócito mede entre 100 e 150 μm do ovócito, enquanto uma célula somática mede de 10 a 20 μm); e porque o embrião ainda está contido dentro da zona pelúcida (figura 1). Um dos pontos críticos durante o desenvolvimento embrionário precoce é a ativação do genoma embrionário. Durante as etapas iniciais após a fertilização, as proteínas e RNAs “herdados” do ovócito são responsáveis pelo metabolismo e desenvolvimento inicial do embrião. É apenas até o estágio de quatro (ratos) ou oito blastômeros (espécies domésticas e humanas) em que o embrião começa a sintetizar o seu próprio RNAm (mensageiro) e as proteínas específicas necessárias para controlar o seu crescimento e metabolismo. A qualidade do ovócito que é fertilizado, consequente- mente, tem um grande impacto sobre a sobrevivência inicial do embrião. Quando o embrião atinge uma média de 16 a 32 células é conhecido como mórula (tabela 1) (do latim morus: mora), e nesta fase o embrião começa a compactar-se, o que ocorre porque começam a estabelecer-se diferentes uniões celulares, de acordo com a relação espacial entre os blastômeros. As células centrais desenvolvem-se incluindo entre elas junções comunicantes, conhecidas também como junções GAP, enquanto as que se encontram na periferia estabelecem uniões estreitas, dando origem a duas subpopulações distintas de blastômeros: periféricos e centrais. Cabe mencionar que os blastômeros que compõem a mórula ainda são células capazes de dar origem a um novo indivíduo completo, ou seja, são totipotenciais. À medida que a mórula continua a dividir-se e a crescer, as células localizadas na periferia começam a liberar sódio para os espaços intercelulares, criando uma diferença na pressão osmótica seguida pela entrada de água ao embrião. O líquido se acumula e provoca a separação das células, distinguindo ainda mais as duas subpopulações de células mencionadas (periféricas e centrais) e forma-se uma cavidade cheia de líquido. Esta cavidade é conhecida como blastocele; com a sua formação o embrião entra em fase de blastocisto (figura 1, tabela 1). Da subpopulação celular da periferia se origina do trofoblasto (trofoectoderma) que formará a maioria das membranas extraembrionárias (placenta), e da subpopulação central é estabelecida a massa celular interna ou embrioblasto, que dará origem ao embrião propriamente dito, ou seja, ao feto. Ao continuar a multiplicação e crescimento do trofoblasto à medida que o blastocisto se desenvolve, as células da massa interna se diferenciam novamente em dois segmentos distintos: a endoderme primitiva ou hipoblasto e o epiblasto (figura 1), em que todos os tecidos do organismo (saco vitelino) são originados e as células germinativas primordiais. Uma vez formado, o epiblasto continua a dividir-se e a diferenciar-se para dar origem às três placas ou camadas germinativas conhecidas como endoderme, mesoderme e ectoderme. Este processo é conhecido como gastrulação, e durante este diferem-se no embrião as porções craniais, caudais, dorsais e ventrais, processo conhecido como polaridade do embrião, que orienta o desenvolvimento dos diversos tecidos e órgãos do indivíduo. À medida que o blastocisto continua crescendo e diferenciando-se, vai-se acumulando mais líquido no blastocele, com o que a pressão interna aumenta e a zona pelúcida começa a ficar mais fina. Este fato, juntamente com a ação de proteases produzidas pelo embrião, leva à ruptura da zona pelúcida e à saída do blastocisto (eclosão), pelo que, uma vez liberado, o embrião é conhecido como blastocisto eclodido. O trofoblasto embrionário entra, então, em contato direto com o endométrio, o que é considerado como o início da implantação. IMPLANTAÇÃO O trofoblasto embrionário, também conhecido como trofoectoderma, dá origem à maioria das membranas fetais ou placenta fetal. O processo no qual o trofoblasto se une ao endométrio materno é conhecido como implantação; para isso ocorre uma série de processos altamente sincronizados envolvendo secreções embrionárias e maternas, e interações físicas, durante um período limitado conhecido como janela de receptividade. A implantação é considerada um processo gradual que genericamente se divide em cinco fases, algumas das quais podem sobrepor-se parcialmente e diferir segundo a espécie: 1. Eclosão do blastocisto da zona pelúcida (figura 2); -/- 2. Pré-contato e orientação do blastocisto. É o contato inicial entre as células do trofoblasto e do epitélio endometrial, bem como a orientação da massa celular interna e do trofoectoderma, que assume especial importância em espécies cuja implantação é invasiva, como em roedores e primatas; 3. Aposição - refere-se ao posicionamento do blastocisto numa determinada área e de uma forma específica no útero. Começa a interdigitação das vilosidades coriônicas com o epitélio luminal do endométrio. 4. Adesão - requer sistemas de sinalização que envolvem glicoproteínas de adesão, como integrinas, selectinas e galectinas, com os seus ligantes, tanto no epitélio luminal como no epitélio trofoectoderma. 5. Invasão endometrial - este termo se relaciona ao tipo de placentação e é pertinente sobretudo para aquelas espécies onde existe uma fusão entre células do trofoblasto e do epitélio do endométrio durante a formação da placenta, ou que as células trofoblásticas penetrem as camadas endometriais e até modifiquem as células do endométrio que as rodeiam. Existem três tipos de implantação ou nidação. Na nidação central ou não invasiva, a vesícula embrionária ocupa uma posição central na luz do útero e, na sua relação com a mucosa uterina, unicamente através das vilosidades coriônicas (projeções das células trofoblásticas dentro das quais crescem capilares do feto), há adesão mas não invasão da mucosa. Este tipo ocorre nos ungulados domésticos, mas não em carnívoros. Na nidação excêntrica a vesícula embrionária está inserida num canal profundo da mucosa, parcialmente isolada da luz principal, e se apresenta na rata, cadela e gata. A nidação intersticial é própria dos primatas, rato e cobaia, e nesta produz-se a destruição do epitélio e do tecido conjuntivo do útero, de modo que a vesícula embrionária se afunda na própria lâmina mucosa e se desenvolve em um espaço intersticial. Até o momento da implantação, a nutrição do embrião é histotrófica, sendo as substâncias necessárias absorvidas através do trofoblasto, como foi mencionado anteriormente. A partir deste momento, o trofoblasto começa o desenvolvimento de uma série de membranas extraembrionárias que permitirão finalmente a troca de nutrientes e metabólitos entre o sangue materno e o do embrião, constituindo a placenta. Um fato necessário na implantação é a perda de receptores para progesterona no epitélio luminal do endométrio, e pré-sensibilização do mesmo pelos estrógenos. Apesar de parecer um efeito contraditório, este requisito permite o desaparecimento de uma camada de mucina e outros compostos proteicos, que revestem o endométrio e que atuam como uma película antiaderente que inicialmente não permite a aposição e adesão do embrião. O desaparecimento desta camada ocorre durante a janela de receptividade, seja em toda a superfície do endométrio (ruminantes, suínos e roedores) ou nas zonas específicas onde o blastocisto será implantado (humano e coelho). Por esta razão, a interação física entre o embrião e o endométrio desempenha um papel importante na implantação. Uma vez que a camada de glicoproteínas desaparecer, é possível a aposição do trofoectoderma embrionário e das células epiteliais do endométrio, iniciando assim a implantação propriamente dita através da intercomunicação entre os dois tecidos. A implantação pode ser considerada como a fixação do embrião ao útero a partir do ponto de vista físico e funcional. No entanto, como se trata de um processo progressivo e gradual, em que algumas das suas fases podem ser parcialmente sobrepostas, não existe consenso sobre o período em que se inicia e termina. Na borrega, por exemplo, estima-se que ocorra entre o dia 10 e o dia 22, enquanto na vaca entre os dias 11 e 40 pós-ovulação. Nas espécies polítocas, isto é, fêmeas que parem várias crias como as porcas, os blastocistos se distribuem ao longo dos cornos uterinos como resultado de movimentos musculares da parede uterina, aparentemente regulados por prostaglandinas e outros fatores secretados pelo útero. Por exemplo, nas porcas, os blastocistos se movem livremente entre os cornos, e a distribuição dos embriões ao implantar-se é mais uniforme do que poderia ser esperado se ocorresse meramente ao acaso. Tem observado que a deficiência na produção de ácido lisofosfatídico 3 (LPA3) e/ou seu receptor, ocasiona uma falha na distribuição dos embriões no útero. Por outro lado, não há evidência de que um blastocisto implantado exerça alguma influência inibitória sobre a implantação de outro blastocisto próximo a ele. Como supracitado, o processo de implantação inclui uma complexa interação entre o embrião e o útero, e cada um deles provê de estímulos essenciais para favorecer a progressão do outro, apresentando-se diferenças em tempos e particularidades dentro das diferentes espécies. -/- Porca O período de adesão situa-se entre os dias 12 e 24 após a fertilização. Ao redor do dia sete, o blastocisto é eclodido, porque o trofoblasto está em contato direto com o epitélio uterino e começa a proliferar com rapidez. O endoderme se forma e o blastocisto muda de uma pequena vesícula esférica para um tubo muito alongado que chega a medir cerca de um metro em poucos dias, ele que lhe proporciona uma superfície muito ampla para a absorção de nutrientes. Cadela Os embriões migram entre os dois cornos uterinos do dia 12 ao 17 após a fertilização, distribuindo-se de maneira uniforme. Estes embriões aderem ao endométrio entre os dias 16 e 18, e alcançam sua implantação final entre o dia 17 e 20 da gestação. Cabe ressaltar que nos caninos o período de pré-implantação é o mais longo das espécies domésticas, o que ocorre porque a cadela ovula ovócitos imaturos (ovócitos primários) que precisam amadurecer por dois a três dias, para formar ovócitos secundários, antes que a fertilização seja possível. Por isso, o zigoto canino chega à junção útero-tubárica entre o sétimo e o décimo dia após o pico pré-ovulatório de LH (a ovulação ocorre, em média, dois dias após o pico de LH), entrando no útero em estágio de mórula ou blastocisto em torno dos dias 10 a 12 depois do referido pico. Ovelha O desenvolvimento precoce do blastocisto é muito semelhante ao da porca. Observa-se certo grau de adesão desde o dia 10 da gestação, mas o alongamento do embrião é menos extenso do que em suínos e tem início entre o dia 11 e 12. Para a terceira semana o embrião ovino chega a medir até 30 cm de comprimento. O processo de implantação é concluído aproximadamente entre a quarta e quinta semana de gestação (figura 3). Vaca O processo de implantação é semelhante ao da borrega, mas tem início mais tarde. A zona pelúcida se perde por volta do dia 9 a 10 (blastocisto eclodido) e o embrião começa a alongar-se ao redor do dia 12 a 14, atingindo um comprimento de cerca de 60 mm para o dia 16, embora possa haver uma grande variação individual. A partir do dia 33, o córion é formado e existe uma adesão inicial que inclui dois ou quatro cotilédones, que se interdigitam rapidamente com o tecido materno de modo que o embrião começa a nutrir-se através deles. Égua O blastocisto atinge um diâmetro de cinco centímetros aos dois meses e pratica- mente não se alonga. Entre os dias seis e sete após a ovulação, o embrião começa a revestir-se de uma camada glicoproteica que se forma entre o trofoectoderma e a zona pelúcida e que contém e mantém o embrião esférico depois de ter eclodido. Esta cápsula é uma estrutura única nos equinos (cápsula embrionária), afina-se no dia 18 e se perde entre os dias 21 e 23 de gestação. Na décima semana as microvilosidades do córion se interdigitam com a mucosa da parede uterina e na semana 14 é completada a implantação. Espécies não domésticas Em algumas espécies como os marsupiais, os ursos, focas, doninhas e alguns tipos de cervídeos, pode interromper-se temporariamente o desenvolvimento do embrião in utero e adiar a sua implantação, como estratégia evolutiva para favorecer o nascimento das crias em condições ambientais favoráveis para a sua sobrevivência. Esta estratégia é conhecida como diapausa e pode ser uma condição obrigatória ou facultativa para cada gestação, dependendo da espécie. Os mecanismos que a desencadeiam e a concluem não estão totalmente explicados e são espécie-específica. RECONHECIMENTO MATERNO DA GESTAÇÃO (RMG/RMP) O estabelecimento da gestação em mamíferos domésticos requer a presença de um corpo lúteo CL funcional que produz progesterona em quantidades adequadas para manter o desenvolvimento embrionário inicial e permitir mudanças necessárias durante o período de peri-implantação. Para que o corpo lúteo seja mantido e a fêmea seja impedida de reiniciar um novo ciclo estral, o embrião deve sinalizar sua presença para a mãe. O sinal para o reconhecimento materno da gestação (RMG) provém então do embrião e podem ser de dois tipos: luteotrópico ou anti-luteolítico. No primeiro, a(s) substância(s) produzida(s) pelo embrião que atua(am) sobre o corpo lúteo para manter sua funcionalidade, por exemplo a gonadotrofina coriônica humana (hCG) e a prolactina em roedores. O segundo tipo de sinal previne ativamente a luteólise, e é o mecanismo presente nas espécies domésticas em que o embrião produz substâncias como o interferon-τ (IFN-τ) em ruminantes ou os estrógenos em suínos. Ruminantes Como supracitado, o IFN-τ é responsável pela sinalização para o reconhecimen- to materno da gestação neste grupo que engloba cabras, ovelhas e vacas (figura 4). É um fator produzido pelas células do trofoblasto do embrião, e pode ser detectado a partir dos dias 11 a 12 em ovinos e de 14 a 15 em bovinos. Uma vez secretado, o IFN-τ impede a lise do corpo lúteo (efeito anti-luteolítico) por meio do bloqueio indireto da síntese de prostaglandina F2 alfa (PGF2α). No trabalho acerca do ciclo estral foi explicado que a luteólise requer a presença de receptores de ocitocina (OTR) no endométrio, que ao unir-se ao seu ligante, a ocitocina (proveniente inicialmente do hipotálamo e posteriormente de origem lútea), estimulam a produção de PGF2α e estabelecem um feedback positivo, que culminará na destruição do CL. Para que os OTRs sejam sintetizados, é necessária uma estimulação prévia do endométrio com estradiol, que ocorre através da ligação com seus receptores (ER-1). O mecanismo pelo qual o IFN-τ impede a lise do corpo lúteo é bloqueando, direta ou indiretamente, a síntese de OTR e, consequentemente, a produção pulsátil de PGF2α. Suínos No caso dos suínos, considera-se que o sinal embrionário para o reconhecimento materno da gestação são os estrógenos, produzidos pelos embriões em torno do dia 11 a 12 pós-ovulação. O endométrio suíno produz PGF2α que, quando não há gestação, é secretado na circulação uterina (secreção endócrina), de onde é transportada em direção ao CL para causar luteólise. Se há embriões no útero produzindo suficiente quantidades de estradiol, isso redireciona a secreção de PGF2α para o lúmen uterino (secreção exócrina), evitando que seja liberado para a circulação e, portanto, é sequestrado impedindo que chegue ao corpo lúteo (figura 5). É importante enfatizar que a produção de PGF2α não é inibida, mas sua secreção é redirecionada. Este mecanismo é conhecido como teoria endócrino-exócrina. Vale ressaltar que para o sinal de reconhecimento materno da gestação na porca ser eficiente, é necessário a presença de pelo menos quatro embriões, dois em cada corno, uma vez que se não houver dois embriões, um em cada corno, ocorre luteólise e reinicia a atividade cíclica. Embora os estrógenos sejam identificados como o sinal de reconhecimento materno nesta espécie, o embrião suíno também produz outros fatores, como a PGE2 e o ácido lisofosfatídico, considerado necessário para o estabelecimento adequado da gestação. A PGE2 ocasiona uma redução na produção de PGF2α em favor da PGE2 no endométrio e favorece a contração do miométrio para permitir a migração de embriões. O ácido lisofosfatídico, juntamente com seu receptor, é um fator crítico que favorece a migração intra-uterina, e permite uma distribuição adequada dos embriões ao longo dos cornos. Outras substâncias produzidas pelo embrião suíno são o IFN-delta (IFN-δ) e IFN-gama (IFN-γ), que não possuem ação anti-luteolítica, mas poderiam intervir no processo de implantação. Equinos Na égua é essencial que o embrião, ainda rodeado pela sua cápsula embrionária, migre de 12 a 14 vezes por dia através do útero, entre os dias 12 e 14 após ovulação, a fim de distribuir o fator de reconhecimento materno (figura 6). Embora seja sabido que existe, este último ainda não foi identificado, mas foi estabelecido que é da natureza proteica e seu principal efeito é a inibição da produção endometrial de PGF₂α, mediante a redução na formação do receptores de ocitocina; desta forma, evita-se o início do sinal luteolítico. É interessante notar que nesta espécie a ocitocina não é de origem lútea e sim endometrial. Primatas Ao contrário das espécies domésticas mencionadas, o mecanismo de ação do sinal de reconhecimento materno em primatas é luteotrópico. No humano, o embrião produz gonadotrofina coriônica humana (hCG) após o início da implantação (dias 6 a 8). A hCG estende a vida funcional do CL por meio de sua ligação a receptores lúteos para LH, estimulando assim a liberação de progesterona. Este efeito permite a “sobrevivência” do CL pelo menos até o momento em que a produção de progesterona é transferida para a placenta para levar a gestação a termo. Carnívoros Na cadela não é necessário o reconhecimento da gestação, já que normalmente o corpo lúteo tem uma vida média maior que a duração da gestação. Como na égua, a migração dos embriões através do útero antes da implantação pode favorecer o reconhecimento materno. Adicionalmente, tem sido descrito que durante o período antes da implantação (< 10 dias depois da ovulação), há um aumento na expressão de genes relacionados com a imunomodulação local (IFN-γ, IL-4 e CD8+), que não estão presentes em cadelas durante o diestro. A produção de IFN-γ por parte do embrião canino, como em outras espécies, pode estar envolvida na implantação ou o reconheci- mento da gestação, mas até o momento não foi demonstrado de forma inequívoca. Na gata doméstica, o fator que favorece o reconhecimento materno da gestação ainda não foi descrito. Temos que lembrar que seja qual for o mecanismo envolvido, a produção do sinal embrionário de reconhecimento materno da gestação é importante, já que a contínua presença de progesterona na circulação materna, faz possível que ocorra o desenvolvimento precoce do embrião e eventualmente a implantação, com a formação do órgão temporal mais importante para o desenvolvimento fetal: a placenta. Resumindo, o sinal enviado pelo embrião deve ser dado antes do útero começar a secretar PGF2a, hormônio que causa a destruição do corpo lúteo produtor da progesterona necessária para a gestação. O embrião deve secretar algumas substâncias (denominadas EPF: Early Pregnant Factors/fatores de gestação precoce) que capte o endométrio materno e sirva para evitar a ação luteolítica da PGF2a. Na porca, em vez de ser evitada a secreção de PGF2a, o referido hormônio é “sequestrado na luz do útero” e, desta forma, passa a secretar-se em forma exócrina, sem ter efeito sobre o corpo lúteo. No bovino, o reconhecimento materno da gestação é o processo fisiológico no qual o embrião, por meio de sinais moleculares como a secreção de interferon-τ (IFN-τ), anuncia sua presença no trato reprodutivo materno a fim de evitar que seja desencadeado o mecanismo luteolítico exercido pela PGF2a sobre o corpo lúteo. PLACENTAÇÃO Nos mamíferos domésticos, o processo de implantação é gradual e prolongado, e ocorre paralelamente a processos como a gastrulação e a formação de membranas extra- embrionárias: saco vitelino, âmnio, alantóides e córion. A formação das membranas extraembrionárias nos mamíferos eutérios, ou seja, aqueles que formam uma placenta completa, é um processo indispensável que permite ao embrião aderir-se ou implantar-se ao endométrio materno. As quatro membranas extraembrionárias mencionadas são formadas a partir do trofoblasto, mesoderme e endoderme embrionários. O saco vitelino fornece nutrientes no desenvolvimento inicial do embrião e se converte em vestigial quando a gestação progride; tem origem no endoderma primitivo, estrutura que junta com o trofoblasto e o mesoderma, formam o córion e âmnions. O âmnion contém o líquido amniótico que está em contato direto com o embrião e é a membrana mais interna; ademais, protege o feto, proporciona lubrificação para o parto e serve como um depósito para urina e resíduos fetais. O córion, por outro lado, é a membrana mais externa do embrião e, portanto, é a que entra em contato direto com o endométrio uterino materno; se fixa ao útero, absorve nutrientes do útero, permite a troca gasosa materno/fetal e produz hormônios. O alantóide se origina de uma evaginação do intestino primitivo e é de onde surge o sistema vascular da placenta fetal; a fusão com o córion (placenta cotiledonária), carrega os vasos sanguíneos do cordão umbilical, que liga o feto com o alantóide e é um reservatório de nutrientes e resíduos. Conforme o embrião se desenvolve, o saco vitelino regride e o alantóide se enche de líquido, pelo que este último se funde com o córion para formar o corioalantóides, que se torna a membrana mais externa e, portanto, a porção fetal do placenta. A placenta é um órgão temporário que representa uma interface através da qual realiza a troca bidirecional de nutrientes, gases, hormônios e outras substâncias entre a mãe e o feto. A unidade funcional da placenta são as vilosidades corioalantóicas, as quais são projeções pequenas dos corioalantóides que se interdigitam com o endométrio uterino, cuja superfície de absorção permite essa troca. A placenta é um órgão endócrino capaz de produzir uma gama de hormônios que ajudam a controlar o ambiente uterino, favorecendo o desenvolvimento do feto, além disso possui um papel importante no momento do parto. Nas diferentes espécies a placenta tem características particulares, pelo qual existem várias classificações, de acordo com a sua posição uterina, a distribuição das vilosidades corioalantóicas e a sua histologia. Posição uterina Refere-se à posição do concepto em relação ao lúmen uterino (figura 7). Central: O concepto ao ser implantado permanece em contato com o lúmen do útero. A maioria das espécies domésticas de importância veterinária estão dentro desta classificação. Excêntrica: O concepto penetra parcialmente o endométrio materno, mas mantém um certo contato com o lúmen uterino. Os roedores (ratos e ratos) e a coelha possuem este tipo de placentação. Intersticial: O embrião invade o endométrio, perde contato com o lúmen uterino, e ao crescer o lúmen uterino se oblitera. Os humanos e a maioria dos primatas mostram este tipo de placenta. Distribuição das vilosidades As vilosidades que formam a interface materno-fetal podem estar distribuídas de maneira diferente ao longo da superfície dos corioalantóides, pelo qual a placenta pode ser classificada como (figura 8): Difusa: Neste tipo de placenta as vilosidades estão distribuídas ao comprimento de toda a superfície do córion (corioalantóides) de maneira uniforme. As placentas de suínos e equinos se enquadram nesta classificação, embora, nesta última espécie, as vilosidades formem estruturas mais ramificadas, que são chamadas microcotilédones (figura 10). Zonal: Esta placenta se apresenta nos carnívoros domésticos, tanto caninos como felinos. As vilosidades que determinam a zona de troca de nutrientes e resíduos, e de ligação com o endométrio são delimitadas de forma a formar uma cintura central em torno do feto (figura 9). Distingue-se também uma segunda região chamada paraplacenta, que se localiza em ambos lados deste “cinto”, e do qual a função não é inteiramente conhecida, embora sabe-se que desempenha um papel importante na troca de ferro da mãe para o feto. As extremidades laterais dos corioalantóides nestas placentas não possuem vilosidades por isso não se ligam ao endométrio. Uma terceira região é a zona transparente nas extremidades distais do córion que tem pouca vascularização. Esta zona pode estar envolvida na absorção de materiais diretamente do lúmen uterino (figura 11). Cotiledonária: É o tipo de placentação que se encontra presente nos ruminantes (ovinos, caprinos e bovinos). As vilosidades coriônicas nestas espécies são agrupadas em pequenas áreas do córion chamadas cotilédones, que se interdigitam e fundem-se parcialmente com locais delimitados no endométrio chamados carúnculas, formando, em conjunto, estruturas conhecidas como placentomas. Cabe destacar que as carúnculas carecem de glândulas endometriais, que só estão presentes nas porções inter-carun- culares do endométrio. Os placentomas, por sua vez, são altamente vascularizados e são remodelados com o progresso da gestação, ramificando-se para aumentar a superfície de troca e o fluxo sanguíneo para aumentar os requisitos do feto em crescimento. Nas zonas inter-carunculares, a placenta é ligada ao endométrio por meio de sistemas de adesão superficial que envolvem glicoproteínas. Acredita-se que a adesão do concepto com o endométrio (carúnculas) é estabelecida em torno de 30 dias em ovinos e 40 dias em bovinos. (figuras 13 a 17). Discoidal: Nestas placentas, as vilosidades agrupam-se numa área circular ou oval, formando uma estrutura discoidal. Este tipo de placenta é encontrada principal- mente em coelhas, roedores e primatas, incluindo os humanos. Histologicamente Esta classificação considera o número de camadas de tecido que compõem a placenta e que separam a circulação materna da circulação fetal (tabela 3). O número máximo é de seis camadas, três do lado fetal (córion, tecido intersticial e endotélio do vaso sanguíneo) e três do lado materno (epitélio endometrial, tecido intersticial e endotélio vascular) (figura 19 e tabela 3). O modo de distinguir e nomear os diferentes tipos de placenta nesta classificação é usando como prefixo a camada materna que está em contato com o córion fetal. As diferentes placentas baseados em sua histologia são as seguintes (figura 19): Epiteliocorial: É o menos íntimo entre os tipos de placentas (figura 20). Estas placentas conservam intactas as seis camadas de tecido, portanto que mantêm as circulações materna e fetal mais separadas, e consideradas como as mais impermeáveis. Este tipo de placenta está presente na porca e égua. Lembre-se de que as placentas da porca e da égua são diferentes e as vilosidades ocupam uma grande proporção da área de superfície do córion (figura 19 A). Também apresenta-se nos ruminantes, no entanto, as placentas dos ruminantes apresentam algumas características particulares que as colocam como um subgrupo e se chamam sinepiteliocorial ou sindesmocorial (figura 19 B). Na vaca, este tipo apresenta-se nos primeiros 2-3 meses de gestação. Além da característica de erosão parcial do epitélio endometrial, um tipo de célula único é encontrado na placenta de ruminantes. Essas células são chamadas células gigantes binucleadas. Como o nome indica, elas são caracterizadas como bastante grandes e com dois núcleos. Na placenta dos ruminantes, algumas células do epitélio coriônico conhecidas como células binucleadas, se fundem com algumas células do epitélio endometrial, criando inicialmente células gigantes trinucleadas e mais tarde placas ou sincícios multinucleados. Estes sincícios têm em consequência uma origem tanto fetal como materna, que criam lugares delimitados nos quais em vez de existir intacta uma camada de epitélio coriônico e outra de epitélio endometrial, encontra-se uma só camada que combina as duas origens. As células gigantes binucleadas migram e mudam seu número ao longo da gestação em forma dinâmica. Este tipo celular é importante porque secretam uma variedade de hormônios. Células gigantes binucleadas aparecem por volta do dia 14 na ovelha e entre os dias 18 e 20 na vaca. Endoteliocorial: 5 camadas. Neste tipo de placentação o córion fetal está em contato direto com o endotélio vascular do endométrio graças à erosão do epitélio e do tecido conectivo endometrial (tecido intersticial) durante a implantação (figura 19 C). De modo que o intercâmbio de substâncias e resíduos só requer atravessar quatro camadas de tecidos. Este tipo de placenta é presente principalmente em cães e felinos. Nota-se nas figuras 19 C e 21 que este tipo de placenta é mais íntimo do que a placenta epiteliocorial porque o epitélio endometrial não existe mais. Hemocorial: 3 camadas (figura 22). Aqui o epitélio coriônico está intacto e entra em contato direto com o sangue materno em regiões onde formam reservatórios de sangue semelhantes a poços (figura 19 D). O intercâmbio de substâncias e resíduos entre a mãe e o feto é mais direto uma vez que é necessário atravessar apenas três camadas para chegar até à circulação fetal. Algumas espécies de primatas, incluindo o ser humano e os roedores possuem este tipo de placentação. MEMBRANAS EXTRAEMBRIONÁRIAS EM AVES Ao mesmo tempo que se estabelece o corpo embrionário e os esboços de cada um dos órgãos começam a gerar-se, torna-se imperioso garantir a sobrevivência do embrião. Tenha-se em conta que nas aves todo o necessário para o desenvolvimento é encontrado no ovo pelo que deve-se reforçar a eficácia das estruturas criadas para garantir o objetivo a que se destina. O exterior é fornecido apenas com o O2; emite CO2 e vapor de água no exterior (perda de 15% da água durante a incubação inicial). Além disso, o neonato não é imaturo, como nos anfíbios, mas está em um estádio maduro juvenil. Como indicado, são quatro as problemáticas a que deve fazer frente o embrião: prover-se de um meio que garanta o desenvolvimento volumétrico, amortecendo os movimentos físicos excessivos que possam traumatizá-lo e evitar a dessecação; assegurar que os nutrientes (vitelo e albúmen) sejam incorporados de forma correta no interior do embrião; assegurar o intercâmbio de gases; e eliminar substâncias tóxicas derivadas do metabolismo proteico. Para atender estas necessidades são desenvolvidas uma série de membranas extrambrionárias que se vão expandindo progressivamente pelo interior do ovo. A dureza da casca e sua relativa impermeabilidade protege-o igualmente da intempérie terrestre. -/- Figura 23: Evolução das membranas extraembrionárias de galinha (3 e 10 dias de incubação). -/- Saco vitelino: o saco vitelino é a primeira membrana extraembrionária em formação. Aparece como consequência direta da gastrulação: as camadas germinativas que se formam ao nível do disco embrionário expandem-se progressivamente contornando o vitelo. Assim, as células provenientes da área opaca (equivalente ao trofoblasto dos mamíferos) migram sobre o vitelo, terminando quase por cobrir, o mesmo ocorre com o endoderma mais internamente, formando-se assim um saco bilaminar. Posteriormente, o mesoderma se interpõe entre ambos, progredindo igualmente no sentido distal, rodeando o endoderma e aderindo-se ao mesmo e ao equivalente de trofoblasto. Ao estabelecer-se o celoma, o saco é constituído pelo endoderma e folha esplâncnica do mesoderma lateral. Este mesoderma vai progredindo no sentido distal e se vasculariza profunda- mente; os vasos distais se anastomosam formando um anel vascular denominado seio terminal, que marca o limite do mesoderma em expansão. Assim, sobre o vitelo é distinguível um área distal não vascularizada (área vitelina) e uma área proximal vascularizada (área vasculosa) que vai ficando progressivamente maior. Ao sexto dia de incubação mais da metade da superfície do vitelo foi envolvido pelo mesoderma. Os nutrientes do vitelo são absorvidos e desdobrados a componentes mais simples por enzimas produzidas pelo endoderma, sendo incorporados aos vasos vitelinos que os veicularão até o coração, que os impulsionará a todo o embrião. Durante a fase embrionária (até ao sexto dia de incubação), o oxigênio do exterior chega até a área vasculosa por difusão, incorporando-se daqui ao embrião; além disso, durante a primeira semana, as alterações na composição e volume do vitelo fazem que se disponha flutuando sobre o albúmen, o que faz com que a área vasculosa fique em contato com a casca, favorecendo-se assim a respiração. O intestino primitivo se instaura a partir das porções mais proximais do saco vitelino à vez que o corpo é fechado (2º-3º dia). O saco vitelino vai regredindo à medida que se vão esgotando os nutrientes do vitelo que aloja. Pouco antes do nascimento é incorporado à cavidade corporal como divertículo vitelino que fica unido ao jejuno; o divertículo vitelino persiste até seis dias após o nascimento, constituindo uma fonte adicional de nutrientes. -/- Figura 24: Feto de galinho ao fim, perto de ser eclodido. -/- mnios: no segundo dia (-30 horas) de incubação se formam as dobras amnióticas na somatopleura extraembrionária, perto do disco embrionário. Progridem dorsalmente, terminando por convergir e fundir-se cerca de 72 horas de incubação, coincidindo com o fechamento corporal, assim sendo constituído o âmnios, que terminará perdendo todo o contato com o córion. A cavidade amniótica que limita está cheia de um líquido seroso que garante que o embrião seja desenvolvido em um meio aquoso; este líquido é secretado pelo âmnios, mas também composto por substâncias formadas pelos rins, cavidade oral e aparelho respiratório. Córion: após a formação do celoma e o estabelecimento e fusão das dobras amnióticas, a parte da somatopleura extraembrionária que fica mais periférica constitui o córion (também denominado serosa nas aves); permanece formada pela área opaca expandida e mesoderma somático. Progressivamente vai aderindo-se à membrana testácea interna deslocando o albúmen; sobre o dia 12 termina por cobrir toda a superfície interna da casca. Intervém na troca gasosa com o meio ambiente através dos poros da casca e na captação do cálcio desta. Alantóides: o alantóide inicia a sua formação no dia 3 de incubação. Cresce rapidamente, ocupando o espaço exocelômico, terminando por cobrir o âmnios e saco vitelino. Progressivamente, entre os dias 4 a 10, sua parte mais externa se funde com o córion, formando-se o alantocórion, membrana trilaminar que cobrirá a superfície interna da casca, aderindo-se à membrana testácea interna, cujo mesoderma (esplâncnico) se vasculariza intensamente. A partir do dia 7 substitui completamente a área vasculosa como órgão respiratório, sendo garantido o aumento gradual das necessidades de troca gasosa na fase fetal do desenvolvimento (desde o dia 8), de rápido crescimento. A capacidade de capilarização desta membrana é muito maior do que a do saco vitelino. Na cavidade alantóica acumula-se a urina produzida pelos rins, afastando os produtos tóxicos do embrião; a membrana também age sobre este fluido intervindo na manutenção do equilíbrio hídrico e mineral do embrião. -/- Figura 25: Formação do saco vitelino. Limite entre a área vascular e avascular. Seio terminal. -/- O albúmen perde água rapidamente e torna-se menos volumoso e mais viscoso, terminando por desaparecer progressivamente. A ligação do alantocórion à membrana testácea interna faz com que seja marginalizado para uma posição periférica, no polo agudo do ovo. Aqui, o alantocórion que o rodeia constitui o saco do albúmen. O albúmen é a principal fonte de água e proteínas. A água é incorporada ao vitelo, o que, ao tornar-se mais volumoso, provoca que, entre os dias 3 e 4, se rompa a membrana vitelina; apenas restos mortais devem permanecer entre o saco vitelino e o albúmen. Dentro do saco vitelino, a água se acumula principalmente sob o embrião -fluido subembrionário-; este fluido atinge o seu volume máximo (15 ml) no dia 6. As proteínas serão incorporadas principalmente a partir de no dia 12, seja através do saco vitelino, do saco do albúmen ou por ingestão de líquido amniótico, dada a comunicação seroamniótica que se estabelece. Na galinha, a eclosão ocorre aos 21 dias de incubação. REFERÊNCIAS BIBLIOGRÁFICAS -/- Anotações de aulas de Embriologia Básica, Prof. Dr. Edson João da Silva, UFRPE, 2021. BAZER, Fuller W. et al. Novel pathways for implantation and establishment and maintenance of pregnancy in mammals. MHR: Basic science of reproductive medicine, v. 16, n. 3, p. 135-152, 2009. CARTER, Anthony M. Evolution of placental function in mammals: the molecular basis of gas and nutrient transfer, hormone secretion, and immune responses. Physiological Reviews, 2012. CARTER, A. M.; ENDERS, A. C. Placentation in mammals: Definitive placenta, yolk sac, and paraplacenta. Theriogenology, v. 86, n. 1, p. 278-287, 2016. CONSTANTINESCU, G.M.; SCHATTEN, H. Comparative reproductive biology. Carlton: Blackwell Publishing, 2007. 402p. Avicultura: Formação do Ovo. Desenvolvimento Embrionário e Diferenciação Sexual nos Animais Domésticos. Disponível em:. Acesso em: Dezembro de 2021. Diferenciação e Determinação Sexual dos Animais. Fisiologia do Ciclo Estral dos Animais Domésticos. Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva, 2021. Manejo na Avicultura: Postura, Iluminação e Incubação dos Ovos. Transporte de Gametas, Fertilização e Segmentação. FERRER‐VAQUER, Anna; HADJANTONAKIS, Anna‐Katerina. Birth defects associated with perturbations in preimplantation, gastrulation, and axis extension: from conjoined twinning to caudal dysgenesis. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Developmental Biology, v. 2, n. 4, p. 427-442, 2013. GALINA, Carlos; VALENCIA, Javier. Reproducción de los animales domésticos. 2006. GEISERT, Rodney D.; SPENCER, Thomas E. Placentation in Mammals. Springer, 2021. GINTHER, O. J. Reproductive Biology of The mare: Basic and Applied Aspects. 2. ed. Cross Plains, Wisconsin: Equiservices, 1992. GUILLOMOT, Michel. Cellular interactions during implantation in domestic ruminants. Journal of Reproduction and Fertility-Supplements only, n. 49, p. 39-52, 1995. KLEIN, C.; TROEDSSON, M. H. T. Maternal recognition of pregnancy in the horse: a mystery still to be solved. Reproduction, Fertility and Development, v. 23, n. 8, p. 952-963, 2011. MIGLINO, Maria Angelica et al. The carnivore pregnancy: the development of the embryo and fetal membranes. Theriogenology, v. 66, n. 6-7, p. 1699-1702, 2006. MOFFETT, Ashley; LOKE, Charlie. Immunology of placentation in eutherian mammals. Nature Reviews Immunology, v. 6, n. 8, p. 584-594, 2006. PRETZER, S. D. Canine embryonic and fetal development: A review. Theriogenology, v. 70, n. 3, p. 300-303, 2008. SENGER, Phillip L. et al. Pathways to pregnancy and parturition. Current Conceptions, Inc., 1615 NE Eastgate Blvd., 2012. SOZEN, Berna; CAN, Alp; DEMIR, Necdet. Cell fate regulation during preimplantation development: a view of adhesion-linked molecular interactions. Developmental biology, v. 395, n. 1, p. 73-83, 2014. SPENCER, Thomas E. et al. Pregnancy recognition and conceptus implantation in domestic ruminants: roles of progesterone, interferons and endogenous retroviruses. Reproduction, fertility and development, v. 19, n. 1, p. 65-78, 2006. VERSTEGEN-ONCLIN, K.; VERSTEGEN, J. Endocrinology of pregnancy in the dog: a review. Theriogenology, v. 70, n. 3, p. 291-299, 2008. WOODING, Peter; BURTON, Graham. Comparative placentation: structures, functions and evolution. Springer Science & Business Media, 2008. FIXAÇÃO DO ASSUNTO -/- 1. Defina e diferencie os processos de desenvolvimento embrionário precoce, alonga- mento e gastrulação. -/- 2. O que é implantação? Caracterize as fases do processo de implantação. -/- 3. Qual a importância do acúmulo de líquido no interior do blastocele? Qual a importân- cia da eclosão do blastocisto? -/- 4. Caracterize os três tipos de implantação e, depois, explique e diferencie os meios de implantação nas fêmeas domésticas. -/- 5. Defina e caracterize os meios de reconhecimento materno da gestação (RMG) nos animais domésticos. -/- 6. O que diferencia o RMG em ruminantes e suínos? -/- 7. Qual o papel do estradiol no RMG em porcas? O que ocorre quando a porca não fica gestante? -/- 8. Explique o RMG em cães e gatos. -/- 9. Defina placentação e sua importância para a reprodução dos animais domésticos. -/- 10. Quais são as classificações da placentação? Classifique a placentação das fêmeas domésticas. -/- 11. Caracterize e diferencie o processo de placentação em fêmeas domésticas. -/- 12. Observe a figura e responda o que se pede:. (shrink)

The Warner Books back cover proclaims: In the tradition of Oliver Sachʼs [sic] bestselling *The Man Who Mistook His Wife for a Hat...* The manner and misspellingsignify that Cytowic himself had nothing to do with such publishing hucksterism. However, one thing is clear upon reading this book: Richard Cytowic, M.D., is no Oliver Sacks. Though, as will be seen, there is much in here to recommend itself, his stilted reproduction of conversations which or may not have taken place and his (...) CreativeFiction 100 characterizations (i.e., Dr. Wood's continual inhalation of smoke or food) strike the experienced reader as painfully contrived, as though Cytowic were doing hislevel best to imitate Sacks and reach that always-elusive wider audience. (shrink)

This article evaluates an emerging element in popular debate and inquiry: DYOR. (Haven’t heard of the acronym? Then Do Your Own Research.) The slogan is flexible and versatile. It is used frequently on social media platforms about topics from medical science to financial investing to conspiracy theories. Using conceptual and empirical resources drawn from philosophy and psychology, we examine key questions about the slogan’s operation in human cognition and epistemic culture.

In this paper I propose a set-theoretical interpretation of the logical square of opposition, in the perspective opened by generalized quantifier theory. Generalized quantifiers allow us to account for the semantics of quantificational Noun Phrases, and of other natural language expressions, in a coherent and uniform way. I suggest that in the analysis of the meaning of Noun Phrases and Determiners the square of opposition may help representing some semantic features responsible to different logical properties of these expressions. I will (...) conclude with some consideration on scope interactions between quantifiers. (shrink)

This paper -distinguishes between the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and the Hypothesis of Embedded Cognition, characterizing them as competitors (both motivated by situated, interactive cognitive processing, with the latter being the more conservative of the two interpretations of the data) -clarifies the relation between content externalism and extended cognition -introduces the problem of cognitive bloat, as part of a critical discussion of Clark and Chalmers's "past-endorsement criterion" (if the criterion is embraced, we privilege the internal, endorsing process -- which looks (...) more like an embedded view -- and if the criterion is rejected, bloat follows) and as a problem for extended views more generally -develops a dilemma critical of Clark and Chalmers's "explanatory kinds" argument for extended mind and cognition (arguing that their reasoning faces serious problems regardless of whether one individuates the kinds in question in a fine-grained or a coarse-grained way) -argues that an appeal to functionalism doesn't resolve the issue -argues for the priority, in debates about extended cognition, of the identification of cognitive systems (e.g., because a functionalist approach can't be applied unless we already know what count as inputs and outputs, which requires having already identified the boundaries of the cognitive system). (shrink)

The relationship of the author’s intention to the meaning of a literary work has been a persistently controversial topic in aesthetics. Anti-intentionalists Wimsatt and Beardsley, in the 1946 paper that launched the debate, accused critics who fueled their interpretative activity by poring over the author’s private diaries and life story of committing the ‘fallacy’ of equating the work’s meaning, properly determined by context and linguistic convention, with the meaning intended by the author. Hirsch responded that context and convention are not (...) sufficient to determine a unique meaning for a text; to avoid radical ambiguity we must appeal to the author’s intention, which actualizes one of the candidate meanings. Subsequent writers have defended refined versions of these views, and a variety of positions on the spectrum between them, in a debate that remains central to philosophical aesthetics. This Teaching and Learning Guide lists key readings and suggests how they might be incorporated within a syllabus. It also offers focus questions related to the readings. See also the companion article, Sherri Irvin, “Authors, Intentions and Literary Meaning.” Philosophy Compass 1 (2006), 114-128. (shrink)

Recent years have seen fresh impetus brought to debates about the proper role of statistical evidence in the law. Recent work largely centres on a set of puzzles known as the ‘proof paradox’. While these puzzles may initially seem academic, they have important ramifications for the law: raising key conceptual questions about legal proof, and practical questions about DNA evidence. This article introduces the proof paradox, why we should care about it, and new work attempting to resolve it.

Epistemic trespassers judge matters outside their field of expertise. Trespassing is ubiquitous in this age of interdisciplinary research and recognizing this will require us to be more intellectually modest.

In many tragic plays, the protagonist is brought down by a disaster that is a consequence of the protagonist's own error, his or her hamartia, the tragic flaw. Tragic flaws are disconcerting to the audience because they are not known or fully recognized by the protagonist—at least not until it is too late. In this essay, I take tragic flaws to be unreliable belief-forming dispositions that are unrecognized by us in some sense. I describe some different types of flaws and (...) consider what we might do about them. Then I examine three types of policies for managing our tragic flaws: doxastic, dispositional, and methodological. (shrink)

In Big Gods, Norenzayan (2013) presents the most comprehensive treatment yet of the Big Gods question. The book is a commendable attempt to synthesize the rapidly growing body of survey and experimental research on prosocial effects of religious primes together with cross-cultural data on the distribution of Big Gods. There are, however, a number of problems with the current cross-cultural evidence that weaken support for a causal link between big societies and certain types of Big Gods. Here we attempt to (...) clarify these problems and, in so doing, correct any potential misinterpretation of the cross-cultural findings, provide new insight into the processes generating the patterns observed, and flag directions for future research. (shrink)

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...) se face significant independent moral objections. Yet despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular preventive detention, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s, taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health -quarantine model—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own. (shrink)

The idea that there could be spatially extended mereological simples has recently been defended by a number of metaphysicians (Markosian 1998, 2004; Simons 2004; Parsons (2000) also takes the idea seriously). Peter Simons (2004) goes further, arguing not only that spatially extended mereological simples (henceforth just extended simples) are possible, but that it is more plausible that our world is composed of such simples, than that it is composed of either point-sized simples, or of atomless gunk. The difficulty for these (...) views lies in explaining why it is that the various sub-volumes of space occupied by such simples, are not occupied by proper parts of those simples. Intuitively at least, many of us find compelling the idea that spatially extended objects have proper parts at every sub-volume of the region they occupy. It seems that the defender of extended simples must reject a seemingly plausible claim, what Simons calls the geometric correspondence principle (GCP): that any (spatially) extended object has parts that correspond to the parts of the region that it occupies (Simons 2004: 371). We disagree. We think that GCP is a plausible principle. We also think it is plausible that our world is composed of extended simples. We reconcile these two notions by two means. On the one hand we pay closer attention to the physics of our world. On the other hand, we consider what happens when our concept of something—in this case space—contains elements not all of which are realized in anything, but instead key components are realized in different features of the world. (shrink)

Rationalization in the sense of biased self-justification is very familiar. It's not cheating because everyone else is doing it too. I didn't report the abuse because it wasn't my place. I understated my income this year because I paid too much in tax last year. I'm only a social smoker, so I won't get cancer. The mental mechanisms subserving rationalization have been studied closely by psychologists. However, when viewed against the backdrop of philosophical accounts of the regulative role of truth (...) in doxastic deliberation , rationalization can look very puzzling. Almost all contemporary philosophers endorse a version of the thesis of deliberative exclusivity—a thinker cannot in full consciousness decide whether to believe that p in a way that issues directly in forming a belief by adducing anything other than considerations that he or she regards as relevant to the truth of p. But, as I argue, rationalization involves the weighing of considerations that the thinker kn.. (shrink)

When the environment in which an organism lives deviates in some essential way from that to which it is adapted, this is described as “evolutionary mismatch,” or “evolutionary novelty.” The notion of mismatch plays an important role, explicitly or implicitly, in evolution-informed cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, and medicine. The evolutionary novelty of our contemporary environment is thought to have significant implications for our health and well-being. However, scientists have generally been working without a clear definition of mismatch. This paper defines (...) mismatch as deviations in the environment that render biological traits unable, or impaired in their ability, to produce their selected effects. The machinery developed by Millikan in connection with her account of proper function, and with her related teleosemantic account of representation, is used to identify four major types, and several subtypes, of evolutionary mismatch. While the taxonomy offered here does not in itself resolve any scientific debates, the hope is that it can be used to better formulate empirical hypotheses concerning the effects of mismatch. To illustrate, it is used to show that the controversial hypothesis that general intelligence evolved as an adaptation to handle evolutionary novelty can, contra some critics, be formulated in a conceptually coherent way. (shrink)

Much of the recent philosophical discussion about free will has been focused on whether compatibilists can adequately defend how a determined agent could exercise the type of free will that would enable the agent to be morally responsible in what has been called the basic desert sense :5–24, 1994; Fischer in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Four views on free will, Wiley, Hoboken, 2007; Vargas in Philos Stud, 144:45–62, 2009). While we agree with Derk Pereboom (...) and others that the compatibilist’s burden should be properly understood as providing a compelling account of how a determined agent could be morally responsible in the basic desert sense, the exact nature of this burden has been rendered somewhat unclear by the fact that there has been no definitive account given as to what the basic desert sense of moral responsibility amounts to. In Sect. 1 we set out to clarify the compatibilist’s burden by presenting our account of basic desert moral responsibility—which we call retributivist desert moral responsibility for purposes of clarity—and explain why it is of central philosophical and practical importance to the free will debate. In Sect. 2 we employ a thought experiment to illustrate the kind of difficulty that compatibilists of any stripe are likely to encounter in attempting to explain how determined agents can exercise the kind of free will needed for retributivist desert moral responsibility. (shrink)

Nathan Salmon; XII*—How to Measure the Standard Metre, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 88, Issue 1, 1 June 1988, Pages 193–218.

Within the United States, the most prominent justification for criminal punishment is retributivism. This retributivist justification for punishment maintains that punishment of a wrongdoer is justified for the reason that she deserves something bad to happen to her just because she has knowingly done wrong—this could include pain, deprivation, or death. For the retributivist, it is the basic desert attached to the criminal’s immoral action alone that provides the justification for punishment. This means that the retributivist position is not reducible (...) to consequentialist considerations nor in justifying punishment does it appeal to wider goods such as the safety of society or the moral improvement of those being punished. A number of sentencing guidelines in the U.S. have adopted desert as their distributive principle, and it is increasingly given deference in the “purposes” section of state criminal codes, where it can be the guiding principle in the interpretation and application of the code’s provisions. Indeed, the American Law Institute recently revised the Model Penal Code so as to set desert as the official dominate principle for sentencing. And courts have identified desert as the guiding principle in a variety of contexts, as with the Supreme Court’s enthroning retributivism as the “primary justification for the death penalty.” While retributivism provides one of the main sources of justification for punishment within the criminal justice system, there are good philosophical and practical reasons for rejecting it. One such reason is that it is unclear that agents truly deserve to suffer for the wrongs they have done in the sense required by retributivism. In the first section, I explore the retributivist justification of punishment and explain why it is inconsistent with free will skepticism. In the second section, I then argue that even if one is not convinced by the arguments for free will skepticism, there remains a strong epistemic argument against causing harm on retributivist grounds that undermines both libertarian and compatibilist attempts to justify it. I maintain that this argument provides sufficient reason for rejecting the retributive justification of criminal punishment. I conclude in the third section by briefly sketching my public health-quarantine model, a non-retributive alternative for addressing criminal behavior that draws on the public health framework and prioritizes prevention and social justice. I argue that the model is not only consistent with free will skepticism and the epistemic argument against retributivism, it also provides the most justified, humane, and effective way of dealing with criminal behavior. (shrink)

Broadly speaking, the contemporary scientific realist is concerned to justify belief in what we might call theoretical truth, which includes truth based on ampliative inference and truth about unobservables. Many, if not most, contemporary realists say scientific realism should be treated as ‘an overarching scientific hypothesis’ (Putnam 1978, p. 18). In its most basic form, the realist hypothesis states that theories enjoying general predictive success are true. This hypothesis becomes a hypothesis to be tested. To justify our belief in the (...) realist hypothesis, realists commonly put forward an argument known as the ‘no-miracles argument’. With respect to the basic hypothesis this argument can be stated as follows: it would be a miracle were our theories as successful as they are, were they not true; the only possible explanation for the general predictive success of our scientific theories is that they are true. (shrink)

The Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm says that an event is overall harmful for someone if and only if it makes her worse off than she otherwise would have been. I defend this account from two common objections.

Debate on free will with Christian List, Gregg Caruso, and Cory Clark. The exchange is focused on Christian List's book Why Free Will Is Real.

In this paper I distinguish the category of “rationalization” from various forms of epistemic irrationality. I maintain that only if we model rationalizers as pretenders can we make sense of the rationalizer's distinctive relationship to the evidence in her possession. I contrast the cognitive attitude of the rationalizer with that of believers whose relationship to the evidence I describe as “waffling” or “intransigent”. In the final section of the paper, I compare the rationalizer to the Frankfurtian bullshitter.

One of the most frequently voiced criticisms of free will skepticism is that it is unable to adequately deal with criminal behavior and that the responses it would permit as justified are insufficient for acceptable social policy. This concern is fueled by two factors. The first is that one of the most prominent justifications for punishing criminals, retributivism, is incompatible with free will skepticism. The second concern is that alternative justifications that are not ruled out by the skeptical view per (...) se face significant independent moral objections (Pereboom 2014: 153). Despite these concerns, I maintain that free will skepticism leaves intact other ways to respond to criminal behavior—in particular incapacitation, rehabilitation, and alteration of relevant social conditions—and that these methods are both morally justifiable and sufficient for good social policy. The position I defend is similar to Derk Pereboom’s (2001, 2013, 2014), taking as its starting point his quarantine analogy, but it sets out to develop the quarantine model within a broader justificatory framework drawn from public health ethics. The resulting model—which I call the public health-quarantine model (Caruso 2016, 2017a)—provides a framework for justifying quarantine and criminal sanctions that is more humane than retributivism and preferable to other non-retributive alternatives. It also provides a broader approach to criminal behavior than Pereboom’s quarantine analogy does on its own since it prioritizes prevention and social justice. -/- In Section 1, I begin by (very) briefly summarizing my arguments against free will and basic desert moral responsibility. In Section 2, I then introduce and defend my public health-quarantine model, which is a non-retributive alternative to criminal punishment that prioritizes prevention and social justice. In Sections 3 and 4, I take up and respond to two general objections to the public health-quarantine model. Since objections by Michael Corrado (2016), John Lemos (2016), Saul Smilanksy (2011, 2017), and Victor Tadros (2017) have been addressed in detail elsewhere (see Pereboom 2017a; Pereboom and Caruso 2018), I will here focus on objections that have not yet been addressed. In particular, I will respond to concerns about proportionality, human dignity, and victims’ rights. I will argue that each of these concerns can be met and that in the end the public health-quarantine model offers a superior alternative to retributive punishment and other non-retributive accounts. (shrink)